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Most English adjectives can appear either prenominally or as predicates.
(1) a. the red rose
b. Roses are red.
There are also adjectives that can appear only in one position or the other, but
not in both:
(2) a. * the awake child
b. The child is awake.
(3) a. the former president
b. * The president is former.
The primary goal of this dissertation will be to address two questions that arise
from this data. First, what is the relationship between prenominal red and pred-
icative red? Second, what causes some adjectives, including awake and former, to
be ungrammatical in prenominal and predicate positions, respectively?
To answer these questions, I will appeal to the theory of semantic types and
posit a type-shifting operator that is always present when an adjective appears
in predicate position. The vast majority of English adjectives, including red,
can either occur in their basic form prenominally or combine with the operator
to produce viable predicates. Adjectives like awake cannot occur without the
operator and as such are restricted to predicate positions. Adjectives like former
can combine with the operator but the resulting predicates are ruled out by a
constraint on trivial predication.
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CHAPTER 1
THE DISTRIBUTION OF ENGLISH ADJECTIVES AND THEIR
SEMANTIC TYPES
1.1 Two Puzzles
Adjectives in English have three distinct patterns of syntactic distribution.1 The
first pattern is by far the most common, and I will call the adjectives that exhibit
it Group I. These can appear either prenominally (in what is sometimes called
‘attributive’ position) or as predicates.
(4) a. a red balloon
b. The ballon is red.
(5) a. a happy dog
b. That dog seems happy.
(6) a. a helpful suggetion
b. Your suggestion was helpful.
(7) a. a cruel villain
b. The villain in the story is cruel.
(8) a. an intelligent leader
b. Our organization needs a leader who is intelligent.
Group I distribution is characteristic of size adjectives like big and small, color
adjectives like red and blue, and shape adjectives like square and round, along
1There are many ways to categorize English adjectives, some of which would result in far
more than three categories. The only criterion under consideration here is syntactic distribution.
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with many others. These adjectives have properties discussed in the literature
which will not be discussed directly here, for example gradability and the ca-
pacity to form comparatives (see, among many others, McConnell Ginet, 1973
and Kennedy, 1997). What is relevant here, and what determines membership
in Group I, is syntactic distribution.
Group I adjectives present our first puzzle. How can the same lexical item
occur in two such different positions without triggering a fatal type mismatch?
(9) Puzzle 1:
How do we reconcile the distribution of Group I adjectives with our
theory of semantic composition?
The second distribution pattern is exhibited by a far smaller group of adjec-
tives including, among others, alleged, former, potential, and actual. I will refer
to these as Group II. Their distinguishing characteristic is that they appear only
prenominally and are illicit in predicate position.
(10) a. an alleged murderer
b. * The murderer is alleged.
(11) a. the former prime minister
b. * That prime minister is former.
(12) a. a potential outcome
b. * This outcome is potential.
(13) a. a future president
b. * The fiftieth president of the United States is future.
(14) a. an utter disaster
2
b. * The disaster wrought by a tornado can be utter
The Group II adjectives are also restricted from occurring with indefinite
pronouns (as in 16), in contrast to Group I (as in 15).2
(15) a. Somebody tall must have left that there.
b. Everything interesting has already been said.
c. Anything blue will match this shirt.
d. Nothing good ever happens on a Friday.
e. Let’s go someplace fancy for dinner.
(16) a. * Somebody former must have left that there.
b. * Everyone alleged needs to get a lawyer.
c. * Anything actual has to have come from somewhere.
d. * Everything potential might one day come true.
e. * Nothing future matters now.
The third distribution pattern is exhibited by very few adjectives in English,
which I will call Group III. These appear only as predicates.3
(17) a. * the asleep boy
b. That boy is asleep
(18) a. * He stood with apart legs.
2For discussion of these and other indefinite pronoun constructions, see Larson and Marusˇicˇ
(2004) and Leu (2008).
3These adjectives, like those in Group I but unlike those in Group II, can also occur with
indefinite pronouns.
(1) a. Nobody alive knows the answer.
b. Anyone asleep will need to be woken up.
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b. He stood with his legs apart.
(19) a. * I’m looking for work by an alive artist.
b. The artist whose work I’m looking for is alive.
(20) a. * The awake baby in the next apartment screamed all night.
b. The screaming baby in the next apartment was awake all night.
Asleep, awake, alive, and apart are examples of frequently used adjectives that
belong to this group. Group III also contains a number of more antiquated
forms, including astir, adrift, akimbo, and others. These adjectives have common
morphology—they share the prefix a. Though I will not discuss the historical
origins of the prefix, I will suggest below that it might be analyzed synchroni-
cally as an instantiation of an operator discussed here.
Groups II and III raise the second central question to be addressed: why
do adjectives, which presumably constitute a single lexical category, have three
different patterns of syntactic distribution?
(21) Puzzle 2:
Why do some adjectives have different syntactic distribution from oth-
ers?
My goal in this dissertation will be to address these two questions. To lay
the groundwork, I will appeal to the theory of semantic types, assuming that
syntactic distribution depends on the composition of nodes with appropriate
semantic types, i.e. that a node will be distributionally viable in a given position
(in a syntactic tree) if and only if its semantic type can combine compositionally
with that of the position’s sister node.
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1.2 The problem of Group I adjectives: flexible distribution
The two positions in which we find Group I adjectives require different semantic
types in order to combine with adjacent nodes via function application. Without
committing at this point to any particular types or syntactic structures for these
adjectives, here is a set of configurations that serves to illustrate the structural
difference between the two positions:
(22) a. Barney is a happy dog.
b. Barney is happy.
c. Barney is a dog.
(23) a. IP
llll
llll
ll
RRRR
RRRR
RR
Barney VP
llll
llll
ll
VVVVV
VVVVV
VVV
is DP
uuu
uuu
uu
III
III
II
a happy dog
b. IP
llll
llll
ll
YYYYYY
YYYYYY
YYYYYY
DP
qqq
qqq
q
MMM
MMM
M VP
llll
llll
ll
SSSS
SSSS
SS
Barney is AP
uuu
uuu
uu
III
III
II
happy
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c. IP
llll
llll
ll
YYYYYY
YYYYYY
YYYYYY
DP
qqq
qqq
q
MMM
MMM
M VP
llll
llll
ll
SSSS
SSSS
SS
Barney is NP
uuu
uuu
uu
III
III
II
a dog
Assume, at least for now, that the copula is semantically vacuous (as do, e.g.,
Heim and Kratzer (1998) for sentences of this kind). In (23a), the Group I adjec-
tive happy combines with other material to constitute the sentence’s VP, which
then takes the subject, Barney, as its argument. In (23b), the (appparently) same
lexical item, happy, must serve alone as the sole semantic content of the VP. In
(23c), an NP without any adjective takes the same role, compositionally, that we
have just seen occupied first by a noun with an adjective and then by a bare
adjective. Since they are all able to serve as the full semantic content of the
same node, the VP, apparently all three entities—the adjective + noun combi-
nation, the bare adjective, and the noun—must have the same semantic type.
How is this possible? Assuming that all composition takes place via Function
Application, how can the same lexical item, happy, have the type of a noun and
simultaneously have a type that can combine with a noun? In other words, we
would expect that any Group I adjective should be able to occur in only one of
the two positions: either prenominally with a type appropriate for combining
with nouns, or as a predicate with the same type that nouns have.
The behavior of Group II and III adjectives is less puzzling in this respect.
Like other lexical items, each appears in a particular structural position that
corresponds to a given semantic type.
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To deal with the puzzle of Group I adjectival distribution, we must figure
out what semantic type Group I adjectives have. Do they have the semantic
type required for their prenominal position, or that required for their predicate
position? Or is it possible that each Group I adjective is actually a pair of homo-
phones with distinct types? This question has formed the basis of much inves-
tigation in previous literature. I will review two approaches which I ultimately
reject and offer an instantiation of a third approach that I believe accounts for the
facts while avoiding certain pitfalls of the other two. These three approaches,
broadly construed, are as follows:
1. Approach Type 1: Some Group I adjectives have the prenominal type and
others have the predicate type. Syntactic transformations allow Group I
adjectives to appear in the position that is not appropriate for their type.
2. Approach Type 2: Group I adjectives have a semantic type that sometimes
doesn’t match their syntactic distribution, but a special compositional rule
takes effect in such circumstances and type-mismatch is avoided alto-
gether.
3. Approach Type 3: All Group I adjectives have the same semantic type, and
a syntactic transformation allows them to appear in the position in which
that type would normally be illicit.
The first approach is represented by the Doublet Theory of Siegel (1976).
The second is familiar from Predicate Modification, a solution to the problem
best known for its utilization by Heim and Kratzer (1998). In general, proposals
that take the first approach are forced to make sometimes arbitrary decisions
about which Group I adjectives have which type. If a Group I adjective can, in
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principle, have either the prenominal or the predicate type, what is the deter-
mining factor in the choice? Predicate Modification (or any variation on the sec-
ond approach) avoids this question by assigning all Group I adjectives the same
type. On the other hand, it sidesteps the issue of type-mismatch not by putting
forth any principled syntactic processes that solve the problem as it arises but
by adding an entirely new compositional rule to our semantics that can seem ad
hoc. I will choose the third option.
1.3 Approach 1: Varying Types with Syntactic Transformations
In this type of analysis, each Group I adjective has a semantic type that may or
may not fit every syntactic position in which we find it. In instances where type
mismatch would otherwise result from an adjective with a given semantic type
occurring in the ‘wrong’ position, syntactic transformations rescue the structure.
1.3.1 Parsons (1971)
Parsons (1971), as characterized by Siegel (1976)4, takes one variation on this ap-
proach. He divides Group I adjectives into two sub-groups, assigning members
of one subgroup the type needed for prenominal position and members of the
other the type needed for predicate position. The two lists are entirely disjoint:
every adjective must be placed in exactly one of the two. A sample of these lists
is in Table 1.1.5
4I have been unable to procure a copy of Parsons’ unpublished 1971 manuscript and have
relied instead on Siegel’s discussion of the work.
5Table 1 is constructed on the basis of my understanding of Siegel’s discussion of Parsons’s
work, so it could easily misrepresent Parsons’s actual categorization of some of the specific
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List A List B
carnivorous large
sick clean
parallel big
portable beautiful
nude diligent
four-legged large
angry deep
infinite red
drunk white
rancid blue
healthy terrible
aged original
nearby plain
Table 1.1: Sample of Parsons (1971)’s division of Group I adjectives into
two mutually exclusive lists
Parsons works in the original type system of Montague (1974). An adapted
version, showing the types relevant to his and Siegel’s proposals, is in Table 1.2.
Category Type
IV:Intransitive Verb ( = VP) t/e
T:Term (= DP) t/IV
CN (Common Noun Phrase) t//e
Table 1.2: Semantic Types from Montague (1974)
The notation of semantic types is to be read as indicating that an entity of
the type on the right of the slash(es) maps onto an entity of the type on the left.
For example, the type written as t/e would be written in contemporary notation
as < e, t >. Two categories that are semantically similar but syntactically distinct
will have the same two types on their left and right sides, respectively, but will
differ in the number of slashes. For instance, an intransitive verb has type t/e,
adjectives listed. Since I will be objecting to Parsons’s method of dividing adjectives into two
categories and not to his categorization of any particular adjective, any deviations from the
original categorization that might be discovered on inspection of the original work would affect
the discussion only superficially.
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but a common noun phrase has type t//e. Both take an individual (type e) as their
argument and return a truth value (type t); i.e. both are one-place predicates.
The difference in the number of slashes indicates that their syntactic features are
distinct.
For Parsons and Siegel, the choice for Group I adjectives is between type
t///e and type CN/CN. The former is a function from individuals to truth
values; as such, it can form the sole semantic content of a VP. This is the type
needed for adjectives in predicate position. The latter is a function from one
Common Noun Phrase to another (in today’s notation, << e, t >, < e, t >>). It
takes a noun and maps it to something that has the same type as the original
noun, so that the resulting adjective + noun combination can stand in the same
position as the original noun. This is the type needed for prenominal adjectives.
Parsons (1971) assigns some Group I adjectives type t///e and others type
CN/CN even though they all appear in both positions. On his analysis, syn-
tactic transformations occur whenever an adjective of type CN/CN appears in
predicate position or one of type t///e appears prenominally. The criterion he
uses to classify a given adjective as having one type or the other is intersective-
ness.
Intersective adjectival modification picks out the intersection between the
denotation of the noun and that of the adjective. For example, we could find
the set of carnivorous plants by intersecting the set of carnivorous things with the
set of plant things. In other words, the denotation of the phrase carnivorous plant
would be as follows:
(24) [[ carnivorous plant ]] = [[ carnivorous ]] ∩ [[ plant ]]
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Parsons assigns all intersective adjectives type t///e (list A in Table 1.1,
above), and all non-intersective adjectives type CN/CN (list B in Table 1.1). An
example of a non-intersective Group I adjective, for Parsons, is large. Large, and
other adjectives like it, are taken to be non-intersective because of their behavior
in the following inference pattern, in which they contrast with so-called inter-
sective adjectives like carnivorous :
(25) a. The snake is a carnivorous animal.
b. The snake is a reptile.
c. It follows that: The snake is a carnivorous reptile.
(26) a. Barney is a large mouse.
b. Barney is a mammal.
c. It does not necessarily follow that: Barney is a large mammal.
If the inference pattern goes through, the adjective is classified as intersec-
tive. If it fails, it is taken to be non-intersective.
This test does not always yield clear results, as is evident from the well-
known example of the beautiful dancer (Vendler, 1967). The phrase beautiful
dancer is ambiguous: it can denote a person who is beautiful and who is a dancer
(intersective) or a person who dances beautifully but is not necessarily beautiful
(non-intersective). We can try using the test for intersection, but the results are
inconclusive because of this ambiguity:
(27) a. Maria is a beautiful dancer.
b. Maria is a woman.
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Depending on our interpretation of (27a), the following inference may or
may not be valid:
(28) Maria is a beautiful woman.
The assumption that every Group I adjective will either clearly pass the inter-
section test or clearly fail it is non-trivial, so the choice of intersection as the sole
criterion for placement on a given list and assignment of semantic type seems
dubious. But even if the adjectives divide cleanly as far as intersection, Parsons
additionally requires that the two subgroups be clearly disjoint as far as other
properties, as well. For example, all non-intersective adjectives are taken to be
relative, while intersective adjectives are taken to be non-relative. A relative
adjective is one that is interpreted relative to a comparison class determined in
part by the noun it modifies. For example, a skillful doctor is interpreted as being
skillful relative to a comparison class of doctors. Adjectives that are non-relative
are said to be absolute.
For Parsons, properties of Group I adjectives divide as in Table 1.3:
Subgroup A Subgroup B
type t///e type CN/CN
intersective non-intersective
absolute relative
extensional intensional
examples: four-legged, carnivorous examples: red, big
Table 1.3: Properties of Group I adjectives that cluster together according
to Parsons (1971)
This rigid correspondence between properties is difficult to maintain. For ex-
ample, intersection and absoluteness do not always obviously go together. Re-
turning to the beautiful dancer: even in the intersective reading (in which Maria
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is both beautiful and a dancer, but does not necessarily dance beautifully), it is
hard to believe that beautiful is truly non-relative.
In addition to his dichotomous taxonomy for Group I adjectives Parsons
needs syntactic transformation rules to account for the appearance of type t///e
adjectives in prenominal position and type CN/CN adjectives in predicative
position. These rules apply freely in his system and are necessary to account
for many very commonplace uses of adjectives including, e.g., those in (29), in
which a type t///e adjective occurs prenominally, and those in (30), in which a
CN/CN adjective occurs as a predicate.
(29) a. Dinosaurs were carnivorous animals.
b. I drew two parallel lines.
c. This highway feels like an infinite loop.
d. A four-legged table is more stable than a three-legged one.
(30) a. My favorite t-shirt is red.
b. Autumn in this area can be beautiful.
c. I tried to move, but the pain was terrible.
d. That laundry is clean.
Parsons’s transformation rules are as follows:
(31) a. be a [ADJ]CN/CN 4dummy CN → be [ADJ]t///e
b. NP1 {relative pronoun} be [ADJ]t///e → [ADJCN/CN NP1]
The rule in (31a) takes effect whenever an adjective of type CN/CN is re-
quired in predicate position (as in the sentences in 30). The adjective modifies a
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dummy noun (notated with 4) which is then deleted syntactically. For example:
(32) This mouse is a large 4 → This mouse is large
In combining with the dummy noun, the CN/CN adjective is able to form
a node of the appropriate type for predicate position. In more contemporary
terms, this rule effectively has an adjective of the prenominal type that appears
in predicate position modifying a phonologically null nominal one-place predi-
cate.
The rule in (31b) is a version of the standard reduced relative analysis of
prenominal adjectives. In this analysis, which goes back to early generative
grammar (at least as far as, e.g., Smith, 1961) and has been instantiated more
recently by Kayne (1994), among others, a prenominal adjective results from
raising of a reduced relative clause above the NP. For example:
(33) This is an animal that is carnivorous→ This is a carnivorous animal
Importantly, rule (31b) can apply to the output of rule (31a). This occurs
whenever an adjective of type CN/CN appears in prenominal position but has
an intersective reading. For example, the phrase a good father can be read in
one of two ways: either to say that the person in question is good at being a
father (non-intersective) or that he is both a good person and a father, while not
necessarily good at fathering (intersective). For the latter reading, the derivation
takes place in two steps, first using rule (31a) to turn a type CN/CN adjective
into something of type t///e and then using rule (31b) on the output of that
first transformation to raise the adjective above the noun.
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(34) a. He is a goodCN/CN father. (non-intersective, prenominal)
b. He is a good 4. (by rule 31a; intersective, predicative)
c. He is a good 4 father. (by rule 31b; intersective, prenominal)6
1.3.2 Siegel (1976)
Siegel (1976) takes the same basic type of approach as Parsons but makes one
major modification. Instead of listing each Group I adjective exactly once on one
of two mutually exclusive lists, she lists each Group I adjective twice, once with
type CN/CN and once with type t///e. She acknowledges that this solution is
not economical and is therefore not to be taken up unless analyses in which each
of the adjectives is listed only once prove untenable. Her chief complaint against
Parsons’ analysis comes from a concern about the interpretation of adjectives in
situations in which rule (31b) acts on the output of rule (31a), as above in (34).
According to Siegel, this gives us a spurious interpretation for sentences like He
is a good father. She agrees that the adjective in such a sentence can be read either
intersectively or non-intersectively, but she points out that there is a difference
in possible interpretations between the following two sentences.
(35) a. He is a good father.
b. That father is good.
(35b) can mean either that the individual in question is good at fathering, or
that he is good in general (i.e. has a good character). Or, given the right context,
6It is not clear to me how this structure is compositionally viable given that the dummy noun,
although syntactically deleted after the application of both rules, is meant to be interpreted
semantically.
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it can mean that he is good at something else. For example, at a father-son soccer
game someone might say the sentence in (35b) in reference to one of the adult
players with the intention of commenting on his skills at the game. Siegel points
out that this kind of three-way indeterminacy is not available in (35a).7 In that
sentence, the individual discussed can either be good at fathering or good in
character, but the sentence cannot be used to mean that he is good at anything
else (including, e.g., soccer), even in the right context. This troubles Siegel since,
in order to interpret (35a) as meaning that the individual has a good character
and is a father, we must use the intersective reading of good. As shown in (34)
above, the structure of (35a) with intersective good contains a dummy noun:
(36) He is a good 4 father. (by rule 31b; intersective, prenominal)
If the dummy noun can be interpreted freely, Siegel argues, then in the right
context we should be able to interpret (35a) to mean that the father is a good
soccer player. But we can’t.
Siegel, primarily on the basis of this concern, rejects Parsons’s analysis and
instead proposes what she calls the Doublet Theory of adjectives. Each Group
I adjective is listed twice in the lexicon. One entry has type CN/CN and is
7Siegel uses the term ‘vagueness’ rather than ‘ambiguity’ to refer to this precise kind of in-
determinacy, reserving the term ‘ambiguous’ specifically to refer to the two-way ambiguity that
we do get in (35a), to be discussed momentarily. The term ‘vague’ has been used with explicit
meanings in the literature quite different from Siegel’s. Kennedy (1997) uses it very specifically
to refer to adjectives like tall and distinguishes these from what he calls ‘indeterminate’ adjec-
tives, like smart. The difference is that the scale along which entities can be ordered by tall-ness
is constant, regardless of context, but the ordering of the scale for smart-ness is subjective. If
we call a person tall, we will mean to say different things depending on whether he is, e.g., a
‘tall basketball player’ or a ‘tall third-grader’. We will select a different contextually determined
comparison class to asses the validity of the statement. But the ranking of the individuals as far
as their objective heights will not change. If we call a person ‘smart’, by contrast, then depend-
ing on context the ranking itself might shift: a given individual may be high on the ‘smart’ scale
where math is concerned but lower on the scale where business acumen is in question, to give
one example, so that a ‘smart mathematician’ might not also be a ‘smart investor’.
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prenominal and non-intersective in its base position. The other has type t///e
and is predicative and intersective in its base position. To account for the obser-
vation, also taken into account by Parsons, that both positions can have both in-
tersective and non-intersective readings, she maintains the transformation rules
that allow adjectives of a given type to move to the other position. What Siegel
gains over Parsons is the ability to generate a sentence like (35a) in two dif-
ferent ways, one with an intersective reading (using the t///e version of good
and applying rule (31b)) and the other with a non-intersective reading (using
the CN/CN version of the adjective), without having to derive the intersective
version from a structure that includes a dummy noun.
(37) a. He is a good father (prenominal, non-intersective): goodCN/CN in its
base position
b. He is a good father (prenominal, intersective): goodt///e raised via
rule (31b)
(38) a. That father is good (predicate, intersective): goodt///e in its base po-
sition
b. That father is good (predicate, non-intersective): goodCN/CN derived
with contextually interpreted dummy noun via rule (31a)
This is intended to produce the correct prediction that (35a) cannot be read
to mean that the individual is good at, e.g., soccer. (37a) can mean only that the
subject is good at fathering. (37b) can mean only that the subject is both good
and a father, intersectively. These are now the only two readings available for
(35a). (35b) is ambiguous between the readings in (38a) and (38b). (38a) means
roughly the same thing as (37b): the father is good. (38b), on the other hand, can
mean that the father is a good person, a good father, a good soccer player, etc.,
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depending on the contextually-determined interpretation of the dummy noun.
For Siegel, the difference in interpretive possibilities for the adjective in (37a)
and that in (38b) warrants a four-way theory of Group I adjectives, in which
both the intersective and non-intersective reading of each adjective can be either
base-generated or derived.
Her analysis is summarized in Table 1.4:
Position Intersective? Type Position Derived via Transformation?
Prenominal no CN/CN no
Prenominal yes t///e yes
Predicate no CN/CN yes
Predicate yes t///e no
Table 1.4: Four ways a Group I adjective can occur, according to Siegel
(1976)
In some sense, Siegel’s solution is a worst-case scenario. She needs complex
syntactic transformations and two lexical entries for each Group I adjective. In
addition to being uneconomical, her proposal might lead us to falsely predict
speaker variation in the lexical entries for Group I adjectives. Why should it be,
if each Group I adjective has two lexical entries, that every speaker of English
has both in his or her lexicon? More importantly, both of these proposals ad-
dress only the first puzzle raised above. They offer solutions to the problem of
Group I adjectival distribution, but they have nothing to say about the restricted
distribution of Group II and Group III adjectives.
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1.4 Approach 2: Specialized Compositional Mechanisms
1.4.1 Predicate Modification
Predicate Modification (PM; Heim and Kratzer, 1998) takes the second approach
listed above to the problem of assigning semantic types to adjectives. In PM,
all Group I adjectives are assigned type et.8 PM addresses the type problem
that results whenever a Group I adjective occurs prenominally not via syntactic
transformation but by adding a specialized compositional rule to the semantic
system:
(39) Predicate Modification (from Heim and Kratzer, 1998): if α is a branching
node, {β, γ} the set of α’s daughters, and [[ β ]] and [[ γ ]] are both in Det,
then [[ α ]] = λ xe. [[ β ]](x) = [[ γ ]](x) = 1.
Predicate Modification follows the intuition that many adjectives behave in-
tersectively. Following is an illustration of how it works. (As mentioned above,
Heim and Kratzer take both the copula and the indefinite article to be vacuous
in sentences like (40a).)
(40) a. Susan is a beautiful woman.
8I will use et as shorthand for < e, t >.
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c. [[ Susan is a beautiful woman ]] = [[ beautiful woman ]]([[ Susan ]])
[[ Susan ]] = Susan
[[ beautiful woman ]] = λxe.[[ beautiful ]](x) = [[ woman ]](x) = 1
[[ beautiful ]] = λx. x is beautiful
[[ woman ]] = λx. x is a woman
[[ beautiful woman ]] = (λxe. x is beautiful = 1) ∧ (x is a woman = 1)
[[ beautiful woman ]] = λxe. x is beautiful and x is a woman
[[ beautiful woman ]]([[ Susan ]])
= λxe. x is beautiful and x is a woman (Susan)
= 1 iff Susan is beautiful and Susan is a woman
The truth conditions derived using Predicate Modification match our intu-
itions about the meaning of the sentence: that it is true if and only if Susan is
both beautiful and a woman. PM also avoids the need that arises in analyses
like Parsons’s or Siegel’s for specific transformation rules to help move adjec-
tives between prenominal and predicate positions. With PM, the same type can
appear in both positions with no problem.
PM is a useful tool that has been widely adopted, but it requires that we
abandon Frege’s Conjecture that all semantic composition is function applica-
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tion. Instead of the elegant notion that structures are interpreted via a single
mechanism, adding an ad hoc mechanism to solve a specific problem leaves us
with a system in which most— but not all— composition is function applica-
tion. PM also raises non-trivial concerns about the relationship between syntac-
tic structure and semantic composition, since it is a mode of combining syntactic
nodes that does not correspond to semantic saturation.9
In addition to the theoretical concerns it raises, PM makes false empirical
predictions. It should allow for any two elements of type et to combine, but it
can apparently be implemented only to deal with prenominal adjectives. Other-
wise we would expect to see items of type et combining freely in the grammar
via PM, which we don’t. Most elements of type et, including NPs and VPs,
cannot combine with other items of the same type:
(41) a. i. * John swims runs.
ii. John swims and runs.
b. i. * John likes fruit hates vegetables.
9Leaving Frege’s Conjecture might be less unappealing if there were other instances in which
additional compositional mechanisms seemed to be indicated. Kratzer (1996) suggests a mecha-
nism very like PM, which she calls ‘Event Identification’, that combines an Agent position with
a VP when both are associated with the same event. Like PM, Event Identification relies on
intersection:
(1) Kratzer’s Event Identification:
[[ Agent ]] = λxindividual.λeevent.[Agent (x) (e)]
[[ VP ]] = λeevent.[V (NPob ject) (e)]
[[ Agent ]]([[ VP ]]) = λx.λe.[Agent (x) (e) ∧ V (NPob ject) (e)]
Chung and Ladusaw (2006) take the argument that other compositional mechanisms are
called for even further. They look at evidence of object doubling in Chamorro and claim that
in addition to function application and PM (their ‘Modify’) there is an additional compositional
mechanism (labeled ‘Restrict’) that restricts the domain of a function’s argument without sat-
urating the argument position. (In the Chamorro case, this allows the incorporated object to
restrict the domain of the predicate without saturating it; saturation then takes place via func-
tion application when the predicate combines with the full DP object.)
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ii. John likes fruit and/but hates vegetables.
c. i. * He is an old friend respected colleague.
ii. He is an old friend and respected colleague.
And although adjectives do stack one on top of another prenominally, they can-
not stack in predicate position. Instead, like those in (41), such configurations
require conjunction:
(42) a. I could use a hot nutritious meal.
b. * I could use a meal that is hot nutritious.
c. I could use a meal that is hot and nutritious.
(43) a. I love looking at old Chinese vases.
b. * The vases in this display are old Chinese.
c. The vases in this display are old and Chinese.
(44) a. There are some warm bulky blankets in the closet.
b. * Down blankets are typically warm bulky.
c. Down blankets are typically warm and bulky
PM thus introduces a new composition rule that is too powerful without
properly constraining it.
Third, PM provides too strictly an intersective reading for prenominal adjec-
tives. It fails to account for the non-intersective readings of sentences like (35a),
repeated here:
(45) He is a good father.
22
PM does not directly address the ambiguity of the sentence between a read-
ing where the subject is both good and a father (intersective) and where he is
good at fathering (non-intersective). For many adjectives, the non-intersective
reading, which PM doesn’t account for, is more salient than the intersective
reading, which it does. For example, (e.g. skillful) in the following sentence
does not invite a strictly intersective interpretation.
(46) Sam is a skillful doctor.
Applying Predicate Modification, we predict that x is a skillful doctor should
mean that ‘x is skillful’ and ‘x is a doctor’ are both true:
(47) α = NP
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[[ skillful doctor ]] = λxe. skillful(x) = doctor(x) = 1
[[ Sam is a skillful doctor ]] = 1 iff Sam is skillful ∧ Sam is a doctor
The most salient interpretation of the sentence is that Sam is skillful at doc-
toring. In such a case, it is very possible that he is skillful at doctoring but
terrible at many other things, so that he does not possess the properties denoted
by skillful and doctor independently. But the truth value of [[ y is a skillful doctor ]]
that we get by using PM does not match this more salient reading of the sen-
tence. Instead it indicates that Sam is both a skillful individual and a doctor.
Instead of the strictly intersective interpretation of PM, the usual reading of the
sentence requires that skillful have a subsective reading, relativized to the mod-
ified noun.
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If we wished to implement PM without running into these pitfalls, we could
start by offering a syntactic explanation for the failure of adjectives to stack
in predicate position, perhaps along the lines of the restriction on linearizing
adjacent elements of the same syntactic category discussed in Richards (2006).
Richards proposes the following constraint on Kayne (1994)’s LCA:
(48) Richards (2006) Distinctness Condition:
If a linearization statement < α, α > is generated, the derivation
crashes.
This distinctness condition is shown to apply when two nodes with the same
label occur within the same phase in an asymmetric c-command relationship,
and could perhaps be extended to account for the data in (41) and (42) above.
We could also help address the problem, noted explicitly by Heim and
Kratzer (1998), that arises from making all adjectives intersective: a standard
et lexical entry for, e.g., a size adjective like small does not make any reference
to a comparison class determined by the modified noun, even though a small
elephant might still be a large animal. To maintain PM as designed we need ad-
jectives like small to have type et, but we can build an intensional, relativized
semantics into our lexical entries for the adjectives themselves without chang-
ing the type. This would look something like:
(49) [[ small ]] = λx. x is small relative to C, where C is a contextually determined
comparison class
This modification will also help us derive non-intersective readings of adjec-
tives like skillful and beautiful, as discussed above, even with PM.
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Regardless of any modifications or additions to PM that we might make to
solve the stacking and intersection problems, though, it is ultimately untenable
to use PM in any form for modal adjectives like former and alleged (as Heim
and Kratzer also point out). Type et cannot be right for these adjectives: if it
were, they should have no problem in predicate position. Furthermore, even
in prenominal position and using a contextually determined comparison class
C, a former senator on the PM analysis turns out to be a person who is a senator
and who is former relative to C, which makes little sense. Thus PM, like the
first approach taken by Parsons (1971) and then Siegel (1976), addresses on the
first half of our puzzle. It gives us no handle on why adjectives in Group II
and Group III behave differently from those in Group I and no insight into their
behavior.
1.4.2 ‘Inverse’ PM and the glob problem
PM is only one way of implementing the second general approach listed above
to the Group I distribution problem. We could devise a PM-type approach that
lists all Group I adjectives with the prenominal type instead of the predicate
type. Instead of a special composition rule to explain This is a red rose, we’d now
need a special composition rule to explain The rose is red. The ban on adjective
stacking in predicate position would no longer pose a challenge. Instead, the
question would be how an adjective like red can ever sit (alone) in predicate
position.
I will not pursue this sub-approach further here, except to note that this type
of solution would lose one major advantage of PM as formulated above. In
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assigning all adjectives the predicate type (et, or t///e), PM avoids a problem
faced by any proposal assigning the prenominal type (<et,et>, CN/CN, etc.) to
at least some adjectives. This problem has been pointed out by Heim (1999a),
and I will take her example and refer to it as the glob problem.
The problem is as follows: if at least some adjectives can take one one-place
function from individuals to truth values and return another of the same type,
why don’t we see any adjectives like the hypothetical glob in the following sen-
tence?
(50) John is a glob books.
Intended meaning: John likes books
Where the lexical entry for glob is:
(51) [[ glob ]] = λFet. λxe. ∀ye s.t. F(y)→ x likes y.
In other words, once we allow some functions of this semantic type to serve
as adjectives, how can we constrain the set of possible adjectives to keep out
those which we never find in natural language?
PM, despite its drawbacks, does avoid the glob problem. Neither Parsons
nor Siegel avoids the problem—they both assign the prenominal type to at least
some adjectives—but neither addresses it, either.
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1.5 The Third Option
I will pursue the third approach, listing each adjective (from any of the three
groups) exactly once in the lexicon with a specific semantic type. All Group I
and Group II adjectives will be listed with the prenominal type. Group I ad-
jectives in predicate position will be derived via a syntactic process that is also
viable for Group II adjectives. The resulting structures, however, will be ruled
out in a principled way whenever the adjective involved is a member of Group
II. Group III adjectives will be listed with the predicate type, though it is pos-
sible that their shared morphology is a fixed phonological representation of the
same syntactic process that allows Group I adjectives to occur as predicates.
1.6 General Shape of the Dissertation
In the next chapter, I will lay out the details of my proposal and demonstrate
its implementation for all three adjective groups. I will then present a series of
challenges to the basic proposal and lay out my approach to each. Chapter 3 will
deal with the glob problem, as just described (which I must address given the
choices I make) and will discuss other logical properties of adjectives. Chapter 4
will implement the proposal on non-English data, specifically Greek Determiner
Spreading, in which Group II adjectives are again illicit in predicate position.
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CHAPTER 2
TYPE-SHIFTING IN PREDICATE POSITIONS
2.1 Assumptions about semantic types
The first step towards using type theory to explain the syntactic distribution of
adjectives will be to clarify my assumptions about what semantic type(s) En-
glish adjectives have.
My assumptions about lexical entries and semantic types in general are as
follows. First, I assume that a lexical entry is a lambda expression that has a
specific semantic type corresponding to its formulation. Second, I assume that
type-shifting can take place via composition (function application) with other
syntactic objects that may be phonologically null.1
So what semantic types are needed for the two different positions in which
Group I adjectives appear? I offer the following as working syntactic represen-
tations of the sentences in (22) from the previous chapter, repeated here in (52).2
Nouns have type <e,st>: they are functions from individuals to sets of possible
worlds. I will use ν (nu) as shorthand for <e,st> here and throughout.
(52) a. Barney is a dog.
1Although the analysis here relies heavily on semantic types and their ability to combine to
create higher and lower types, it does not employ ‘type-shifting’ in the original sense of Partee
and Rooth (1983) and Partee (1987). Instead, it is a proposal in which a syntactic head alleviates
a potential type-mismatch. Nonetheless, like type-shifting operators I assume that the operator
used here may be language specific and/or phonologically null.
2Since a semantic analysis of the indefinite article is not relevant to the present discussion,
I follow Heim and Kratzer (1998, p. 61) in assuming that the indefinite article is vacuous with
predicate nominals like the ones here. As before, and also following Heim and Kratzer, the
copula will also be treated as semantically vacuous.
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b. Barney is a happy dog.
c. Barney is happy.
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The nominal predicate in (52a) has type ν.
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Since a prenominal adjective + noun combination can appear in the same
position as a noun, as in (52b), that combination must also have type ν.
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As such, and allowing no other compositional procedures than function ap-
plication, I assume that prenominal adjectives must have type < ν, ν >.
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This will also work for sentences with more than one adjective stacked above
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a noun: the lower adjective will take the noun as its argument, producing a
node of type ν, which will then serve as the argument of the higher adjective.
This can continue recursively, which is appropriate since there is no apparent
grammatical limit on the number of adjectives which can appear above a noun.3
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3See Sproat and Shih (1988) for a discussion of ordering restrictions on prenominal modifi-
cation.
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The adjective happy, along with all other Group I adjectives by definition, can
also appear alone in the position of the predicate, as in (52c). We have already
concluded that the node occupying that position must have type ν. But we have
also stated that the lexical entry for the adjective has type < ν, ν >.
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How can we reconcile these two observations?
What I propose is a syntactic object, which I will refer to as an operator (Op),
that combines with the adjective and outputs a denotation of the simpler pred-
icate type ν. In effect, this allows an adjective of type < ν, ν > to occupy a pred-
icate position by overcoming the contradicting type requirements illustrated in
(59)
In the next section I will show how this operator works.
2.2 Proposal part I
2.2.1 Semantic type of the operator
What should the operator look like? There are two possibilities regarding its
semantic type. Let’s assume a simplified tree for the English sentence Barney is
happy, which has an adjective as predicate:
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We know that I′ has type ν, since it combines with an individual of type
e to form a proposition. If the AP happy has type < ν, ν > (and assuming the
copula is semantically vacuous), our type-shifting operator must combine with
the adjective and have either type ν or type << ν, ν >, ν >, depending on whether
the adjective is a function with the operator as its argument or vice versa.
Both options for the operator—taking the adjective as its argument or serv-
ing as the argument of the adjective—are plausible. The respective structures
look something like this:
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To decide between the two, I will use the following lexical entries, one for
the adjective happy and one each for each possible version of the operator:
(62) a. [[ happy ]] = λFν.λxe.λws. F(x)(w) and x is happy in w4
b. [[ Opargument ]] = λye.λvs. 1
c. [[ Op f unction ]] = λA<ν,ν>.λxe.λws.A(λye.λvs.1)(x)(w)
If the Operator is an argument of the adjectival function, as in (61b), we have
this derivation:
(63) [[ happy ]]([[ Opargument ]])
= [λFν.λxe.λws. F(x)(w) and x is happy in w] (λye.λvs. 1)
= λxe.λws. [λye.λvs.1](x)(w) and x is happy in w
= λxe.λws.1 and x is happy in w
If the Operator is a function with the adjective as its argument, as in (61a), we
have the following derivation:
4As discussed above, the adjective’s lexical entry should make some reference to a contex-
tually determined comparison class, which I will ignore for the sake of simplicity here since it
does note affect the current discussion.
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(64) [[ Op f unction ]] ([[ happy ]])
=[λAν,ν.λxe.λws. A(λy.λv.1)(x)(w)] (λFν.λxe.λws. F(x)(w) and x is happy in
w)
= λxe.λws.[λFν.λx.eλws. F(x)(w) and x is happy in w](λy.λv.1)(x)(w)
=λxe.λws. [λxe.λws.1 and x is happy in w](x)(w)
= λxe.λws.1 and x is happy in w
As we can see from the identity of the bottom lines in the two derivations, the
outcome is the same whether Op is a function or an argument. At this point I can
argue for no particular advantage to either choice, and I will choose arbitrarily
to take the operator as a function with the AP as its argument.
2.2.2 Form of the operator
Our operator will be a syntactic head that takes an adjective of type < ν, ν > and
returns a predicate of type ν. Thus its semantic type will be << ν, ν >, ν >.
(65) Type-Shifting Operator for Adjectives:
[[ Op<<ν,ν>,ν> ]] = λA<ν,ν>.λxe.λws.A(λye.λvs.1)(x)(w) = 1
Note that the function A takes as its argument a trivial function of type ν
(λye.λvs.1). This allows for a freedom of interpretation for adjectives in predicate
position that is desirable. For example, in the sentence Barney is happy, we do
not know whether Barney is a happy dog, a happy pet, a happy individual,
etc. The choice may be contextually determined, but it is not encoded directly
in the semantics. Thus the operator does semantic work beyond just giving us
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the right type for an adjective in predicate position: it has the desirable effect of
neutralizing the ν (noun-type) function modified by the adjective.
2.3 Implementation
2.3.1 Testing the Operator
To see how the operator works, let us examine the derivations I propose for the
following set of sentences.
(66) a. John is a happy man.
b. John is happy.
c. John is an alleged murderer.
d. * John is alleged.
Working lexical entries for the adjectives and nouns in the examples follow.
(67) a. [[ alleged ]] = λFν.λxe.λws.∃a ∀w′ wRaw′ → F(x)(w′)
b. [[ happy ]]= λGν.λxe.λws.G(x)(w) and x is happy in w5
c. [[ John ]] = John
5In fact this adjective and others like it should have some reference to context built into the
lexical entry so that the adjective is evaluated relative to a contextually determined comparison
class, as discussed in Chapter 1 in connection with Predicate Modification. The form of the
lexical entry, then, should look more like this:
(1) [[ happy ]]= λGν.λxe.λws. G(x)(w) and x is happy in w as determined from the ordering of
a contextually relevant comparison class C
I will omit further mention of comparison classes at this point, keeping things as simple as
possible to highlight the behavior of the operator, and return to the role of context in adjective
meanings below.
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d. [[ man ]] = λxe.λws.x is a man in w
e. [[ murderer ]]= λxe.λws.w is a murderer in w
f. [[ Op<<ν,ν>,<ν> ]] = λA<ν,ν>.λxe.λws.A(λye.λvs.1)(x)(w)
The lexical entry for alleged appeals to an accessibility relation Ra that allows
us to access the set of possible worlds consistent with all the allegations made
by an individual a in the base world. That part of the entry can be read as ‘for
all worlds w′ such that w′ is consistent with the allegations of the individual a
in the base world w . . . ’. I will treat the accessibility relation as an unexamined
tool that does the work of retrieving relevant possible worlds. Lexical entries for
other Group II adjectives discussed below will also rely on this kind of access to
a relevant set of possible worlds.
2.3.2 Operator with Group I adjectives
Our first task is to compute sentence (66a), repeated here:
(68) a. John is a happy man.
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The noun man, of type ν, combines with happy, which has type < ν, ν >,
forming a predicate of type ν.
(69) [[ happy ]]([[ man ]])
= λGν.λxe.λws.G(x)(w) and x is happy in w (λxe.λws.x is a man in w)
= λxe.λws. x is a man in w and x is happy in w
[[ happy man ]]([[ John ]]) =
λw. John is a man and John is happy in w
The sentence turns out to be true in a world w iff John is a man and John is
happy in w, the correct truth condition according to our intuitions.
For (66b), Op takes the adjective happy as its argument, producing a predicate
of type ν that can then combine with the subject of the sentence, John.
(70) a. John is happy.
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b. IP
llll
llll
ll
RRRR
RRRR
RR
John I’ν
llll
llll
ll
RRRR
RRRR
RR
is OpPν
llll
llll
ll
RRRR
RRRR
RR
Op<<ν,ν>,ν> AP<ν,ν>
qqq
qqq
q
MMM
MMM
M
happy
c. [[ Op ]]([[ happy ]])
= λA<ν,ν>.λxe.λws.A(λye.λvs.1)(x)(w) ([λGν.λxe.λws.G(x)(w) and x is happy in w])
=λxe.λws.[λGν.λxe.λws.G(x)(w) and x is happy in w] (λye.λvs.1) (x)(w)
= λxe.λws.1 and x is happy in w
[[ Op happy ]]([[ John ]]) = λws. 1 and John is happy in w
The sentence is thus true iff ’1 and John is happy’. The first conjunct in the
truth condition is trivial: the operator has effectively combined with the adjec-
tive to produce a predicate of the expected semantic type (ν) without affecting
the interpretation of happy. As we would expect given our intuitions about the
sentence, John could be a happy man, a happy father, a happy baseball player,
or just a happy individual.
Before illustrating the interaction of Op with Group II adjectives, I will di-
gress to talk about where precisely the operator occurs in the syntactic structure
of a slightly more complex sentence.
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2.4 Structure
2.4.1 Stacking
As discussed in chapter 1 in connection with predicate modification, one of the
distributional facts about adjectives that must be accounted for is that they can
stack prenominally but not in predicate position. The data are as follows:
(71) a. John is a tall happy man.
b. * John is tall happy.
c. John is tall and happy.
(71a) shows stacked prenominal adjectives. (71b) shows the ungrammatical
result of trying to stack the same two adjectives in predicate position. If we wish
to use both adjectives as predicates, we must conjoin them, as in (71c).
How does the ungrammaticality of (71b) work under the current proposal,
and can it tell us anything about the syntactic position of Op? I will consider
three plausible structures for the sentence, each placing the operator in a differ-
ent position.
Option 1
The first structure has only one operator for the two adjectives, dominating both
APs.
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Here stacking is already ruled out via a type mismatch (indicated by !), so it is
impossible to conclude anything new about the position of the operator.
Option 2
The third option uses two operators, each one combining with a single adjective:
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Again, the sentence crashes due to type mismatch (indicated by !) .
Option 3
The second structure has one operator again, this time with one of the APs in its
specifier and another as its complement.
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The structure faces no type mismatches, so if it were an accurate representa-
tion we’d expect the sentence to be grammatical. We know it isn’t, so I conclude
that this structure must not be correct.
I conclude that the analysis here can account for the ungrammaticality of
stacking in predicate position only with the added requirement that Op cannot
take an AP in its specifier.
2.5 Operator with Group II adjectives
Returning to the derivations begun above, we can see that the sentence in (66c)
computes properly as well.
(75) a. John is an alleged murderer.
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Alleged, with type < ν, ν >, combines with murderer to produce a predicate of
type ν as follows:
(76) [[ alleged ]]([[ murderer ]]) = λFν.λxe.λws.∃a ∀w′ wRaw′ → F(x)(w′)
(λxe.λws.x is a murderer in w)
= λxe.λws.∃a ∀w′ wRaw′ → x is a murderer in w′
The sentence in (66c) is thus true iff there is some individual a such that in every
possible world w′ consistent with what a alleges in the base world, John is a
murderer in w′. Once again, this is the desired result.
But what happens when we attempt to compute the sentence in (66d)? We
must combine the operator with the Group II adjective alleged:
(77) a. John is alleged
b. IP
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Combining Op with alleged, we get this result:
(78) [[ Op ]]([[ alleged ]])
= λA<ν,ν>.λxe.λws.A(λye.λvs.1)(x)(w)
([λFν.λxe.λws.∃a ∀w′ wRaw′ → F(x)(w′)])
=λxe.λws.[[λFν.λxe.λws.∃a ∀w′ wRaw′ → F(x)(w′)] (λye.λvs.1)(x)(w)]
= λxe.λws.[∃a ∀w′ wRaw′ → [(λye.λvs.1)](x)(w)]
= λxe.λws.∃a ∀w′ wRaw′ → 1
Taking the subject John, we derive the meaning of the sentence as follows:
(79) λxe.λws.∃a ∀w′ wRaw′ → 1 (John)
= λws.∃a ∀w′ wRaw′ → 1
The types work out, but the function represented by the predicate (Op + al-
leged) applies vacuously to the argument John. The truth conditions for the
sentence John is alleged read: true iff there is some person a such that in every
possible world w′ consistent with what a alleges in the base world, 1. The sen-
tence is trivially true.
The predicate [Op alleged] in the sentence can be abbreviated as the follow-
ing constant function:
(80) [[ Op ]]([[ alleged ]]) = λxe.λwe.1
Applied to the argument John, we get the following proposition:
(81) λxe.λwe.1 (John)
= λws.1
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A predicate of this form tells us nothing about its argument. Substituting any
other argument, the predicate is equally (un)informative, giving us the same
proposition (or set of possible worlds) regardless of the argument:
(82) a. [[ Mary is alleged ]]
= [[ Op alleged ]]([[ Mary ]])
= λx.λw.1 (Mary)
= λws.1
b. [[ the kitchen table is alleged ]]
= [[ Op alleged ]]([[ the kitchen table ]])
= λx.λw.1 (the kitchen table)
= λws.1
I will give two additional examples of Group II adjectives combining with
the operator and then generalize from the results. Based on my generalization
about what goes wrong when we apply Op to these three adjectives, I will posit
a constraint on the output of such combinations.
Following are working lexical entries for the Group II adjectives former and
potential. In both cases, take a variable of type s to represent a world-time pair,
so that an expression like ws < w′s can be taken to mean that the world-time pair
w precedes the world-time pair w′ temporally.
(83) [[ former ]] = λFν.λxe.λws.∃w′ < w such that G(x)(w′)
[[ potential ]] = λFν.λxe.λws.∃w′ > w s.t. wRpotentialw′ ∧ F(x)(w′)6
6Here as in the lexical entry for alleged I use an accessibility relation Rpotential to help us access
those possible worlds that are not just later than the base world but also relevant to the potential
of the base world. I treat these accessibility relations as ‘black boxes’, since my goal here is not to
explore in detail the specific meanings of any particular adjectives but to understand the basic
form of the relevant lexical entries and show their interaction with the operator.
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Both are illicit as predicates, like alleged.
(84) a. Bill is a former president.
b. * That president is former.
(85) a. Victory is a potential outcome of the battle.
b. * That outcome is potential.
In order to compute the semantics of the sentences John is former and John is
potential, we will need to combine each of the adjectives with Op.
(86) a. * John is former.
b. IP
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(87) a. * John is potential.
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We get the following results:
(88) a. [[ Op ]]([[ former ]]):
=λA<ν,ν>.λxe.λws.A(λye.λvw.1)(x)(w) ([λFν.λxe.λws.∃w′ < w such that G(x)(w′)])
= λxe.λws.[[λFν.λxe.λws.∃w′ < w such that G(x)(w′)](λye.λvs.1)(x)(w)]
= λxe.λws.[∃w′ < w such that [λye.λvs.1](x)(w)]
= λxe.λws.∃w′ < w such that 1
b. [[ John is former ]] = λxe.λws.∃w′ < w such that 1 (John)
= ∃w′ < w such that 1
I.e., John is former is true iff there is some world-time pair w′ that pre-
cedes the base world-time pair temporally such that 1. The sentence
is trivially true.
(89) a. [[ Op ]] ([[ potential ]]):
=λAν,ν.λxe.λws.A(λye.λvs.1)(x)(w) ([λFν.λxe.λws.∃w′ > w wRpotentialw′ →
F(x)(w′)])
= λxe.λws.[[λFν.λxe.λws.∃w′ > wwRpotentialw′ → F(x)(w′)](λye.λvs.1)(x)(w)]
= λxe.λws.[∃w′ > w. wRpotentialw′ → [λye.λvs.1](x)(w)]]
= λxe.λws.∃w′ > w. wRpotentialw′ → 1
b. [[ John is potential ]] = λxe.λws.∃w′ > w wRpotentialw′ → 1] (John)
= λw.∃w′ > w. wRpotentialw′ → 1
I.e., John is potential is true iff there is some world-time pair w′ that
follows the base world-time pair temporally and is accessible via the
accessibility relation defined by Rpotential such that 1. Once again, the
sentence is trivially true.
In both of these derivations, as in (78) above, we can reduce the predicate
to the same abbreviated form as above in order to highlight the fact that it is a
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constant function:
(90) a. [[ Op ]]([[ former ]]) = λxe.λws.∃w′ < w such that 1
= λxe.λws.1
b. [[ Op ]]([[ potential ]]) = λxe.λws.∃w′ > w. wRpotentialw′ → 1
= λxe.λws.1
Apparently, the predicate that results when we combine any Group II adjec-
tive with the operator can be reduced to the same constant function :
(91) Constant function resulting from the application of Op to any Group II
adjective:
λxe.λws.1
Regardless of the individual this function takes as its argument, it returns the
same proposition: the trivial proposition that represents the set of all possible
worlds.
The general intuition here is that Group II adjectives, when combined with
the type-shifting operator Op, cease to be meaningful (as predicates) insofar as
they cease to distinguish among members of the set of individuals that they take
as their arguments. The combination of Op and a Group II adjective outputs a
predicate that applies vacuously to any argument, always returning the trivial
proposition λws.1 regardless of the input.
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2.6 Proposal part II
2.6.1 Constraint on Trivial Predication
I will posit the following constraint to capture this generalization:
(92) Constraint on Trivial Predication:
A predicate Fν is illicit if ∀x1 , x2 ∈ De.F(x1) = F(x2).
The constraint states that a constant function of type ν is ungrammatical as a
predicate. In other words, in order to be used as a predicate, a function of type
ν must be able to distinguish between arguments. Those that fail to do so in this
way (outputting the proposition that selects the set of all possible worlds) I will
refer to as ‘trivial predicates’.
2.6.2 Triviality and ungrammaticality
Triviality has been taken as a source of anomaly/ungrammaticality in connec-
tion with a number of different linguistic phenomena. Barwise and Cooper
(1981) take triviality to be the source of the definiteness restriction in there-
existentials, and von Fintel (1993) uses triviality to rule out illicit exceptive con-
structions, to give just two examples. There is a major challenge to such analyses
which is noted by both Barwise and Cooper and von Fintel: how can we rule out
some constructions on the grounds that they are trivial when some seemingly
trivial constructions are perfectly licit?
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Gajewski (2002, 2009) discusses this general problem of the relationship be-
tween triviality and grammaticality at length. Gajewski contrasts analyses like
those of Barwise and Cooper (1981) and von Fintel (1993), in which triviality
seems to render a structure ungrammatical, with fully licit sentences that seem
from their structure to be either tautologous or contradictory:
(93) War is war. (tautology)
(94) Steve is a nice guy, and Steve isn’t a nice guy. (contradiction)
Both sentences seem to be fine, but Gajewski (2002) proposes a contrast be-
tween the logical structure of these licit trivial sentences and that of truly un-
grammatical trivial structures. A tautology or contradiction, he claims, is only
ruled out if it is L-analytic. By L-analytic he means that the logical structure
of the sentence, once all non-logical lexical items have been replaced by dis-
tinct variables, is analytic (i.e. inherently true or inherently false by virtue of
form). Logical lexical items, in this analysis, are those which are permutation
invariant. That is, their denotations remain unchanged regardless of shifts in
the domain. We can see that the grammatical sentence War is war is, for exam-
ple, not L-analytic. The denotation of war is not permutation invariant, so each
instance of war is replaced by a distinct variable. The copula remains, and we
get the following
(95) War is war→ x is y (logical skeleton)
Since a sentence of the form x is y is not tautologous, the original sentence is
not ruled out.
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The triviality under consideration here is quite distinct from those Gajew-
ski considers, as it derives not from analyticity but from the application of a
constant function.
2.7 Proposal part III: an economy constraint
I now return to (71c). Note the following contrast:
(96) a. John is tall and happy.
b. * John is tall and alleged.
Why should there be a difference in grammaticality between the two? On
the surface, the conjoined predicate in (96b) appears not to be trivial: it con-
veys information via application of the non-constant function denoted by tall
(regardless of where we put the operator). When applied to an argument like
John it does not apply vacuously: at the least, it tells us that the sentence is true
iff John is tall in w.
Let’s examine two possible structures for the sentence.
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In both of these structures the types work out with no mismatch and the
sentence is (incorrectly) predicted to be grammatical. This is a challenge to the
proposal, which at present thus fails to rule out the ungrammatical (96b).
In (97a), the structure that I will assume going forward, the operator applies
locally to each adjective, creating one trivial and one non-trivial predicate. The
two predicates are then conjoined, yet the sentence is not saved by the presence
of a non-trivial predicate. (97b) is an equally viable structure, in which the op-
erator applies to the conjoined AP ‘tall and alleged’. The resulting predicate is
not trivial at all, it merely contains a trivial conjunct within it. It effectively tells
us that the sentence is true iff the argument of the predicate is tall. So far, then,
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this problematic sentence is not successfully ruled out by our constraint.
The proposal needs to be refined. It must be broadened in order to rule out
data that would otherwise pass by the constraint. To work toward the proper re-
finement, we can look at the structure of the sentence under question in parallel
with its interpretation.
Compare the denotations of these two sentences:
(98) a. * John is tall and alleged.
b. John is tall.
Use the following lexical entries. (Note that we will need two separate en-
tries for and since we will be conjoining phrases with one type in one sentence
and with a different type in the other.)
(99) [[ and1 ]] = λA<ν,ν>.λB<ν,ν>.λFν.λxe.λws. A(F)(x)(w) ∧ B(F)(x)(w)
[[ and2 ]] = λFν.λGν.λxe.λws.F(x)(w) ∧G(x)(w)
[[ tall ]] = λFν.λxe.λws. F(x)(w) and x is tall in w
[[ alleged ]] = λGset.λx.λw.∃aes.t.∀w′ w′Raw→ G(x)(w′)
[[ John ]] = John
Here is what happens when we compute John is tall and alleged, using both of
the possible structures suggested above in turn:
(100) a. [[ John is [Op tall] and [Op alleged] ]]
= [[ [Op tall] and [Op alleged] ]] ([[ John ]])
= [[ and2 ]] ([[ Op alleged ]]) ([[ Op tall ]]) (John)
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= [[ and2 ]] (λxe.λws.∃ae.∀w′w′Raw→ 1) (λxe.λws. x is tall in w) (John)
= λFν.λGν.λxe.λws.F(x)(w)∧G(x)(w) ([[ Op alleged ]])([[ Op tall ]])(John)
= λx.λw.1∧ x is tall in w (John)
= λw. John is tall in w
b. [[ John is Op [tall and alleged] ]]
= [[ Op ]] ([[ and1 ]] ([[ alleged ]])([[ tall ]])) (John)
= [[ Op ]] (λA<ν,ν>.λB<ν,ν>.λFν.λxe.λws.A(F(x)(w)) ∧ B(F(x)(w))
(λF.λx.λw.[∃a.∀w′s.t.w′Raw → F(x)(w′))(λFν.λxe.λws. F(x)(w) and x is
tall in w)(John)
=[[ Op ]] (λF.λx.λw.∃aes.t.∀w′ w′Raw → G(x)(w′)∧ F(x)(w) and x is tall
in w)(John)
=[λA<ν,ν>.λxe.λws.A(λy.λv.1)(x)(w)] (λF.λx.λw.∃aes.t.∀w′ w′Raw→ G(x)(w′)∧
F(x)(w) and x is tall in w) (John)
=[λx.λw.∃aes.t.∀w′ w′Raw→ 1 ∧ 1 ∧ x is tall in w] (John)
=λw.∃aes.t.∀w′ w′Raw→ 1 ∧ 1 ∧ John is tall in w
=λw.1 ∧ 1 ∧ xis tall in w (John)
=λw. John is tall in w
Either way, the derivation of the sentence effectively comes out exactly the
same as that of the sentence John is tall:
(101) [[ John is Op tall ]] = [[ Op ]] ([[ tall ]]) ([[ John ]])
= λA<ν,ν>.λxe.λws.A(λy.λv.1)(x)(w) (λFν.λxe.λws. F(x)(w) and x is tall in w)
(John)
= λxe.λws. 1 and x is tall in w (John)
= λw. John is tall in w
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The truth conditions for John is tall and alleged come out the same no matter
how the sentence is put together, and the predicate applies meaningfully to its
argument, producing a non-trivial proposition, even though it contains a Group
II adjective.
So why is the sentence John is tall and alleged out? I suggest that the sentence is
bad because it contains superflous structure: structure that has no contribution
to the syntactic well-formedness of the larger sentence in which it is embedded
and that does not contribute to meaning in any way.
The trivial predicate Op alleged— or, in structure (100b), the conjoined
predicate— adds complexity to the sentence, but it contributes nothing to the
truth conditions (i.e. the sentence’s meaning). The idea that adding structure
without adding information should be disfavored is in no way novel. Grice
(1989)’s Maxim of Manner can be seen as a rule of conversational reasoning that
relies on comparisons between more and less complex utterances and prefers
those which are less complex, assuming meaning is preserved. Grice’s prag-
matic considerations are, however, crucially violable. A Gricean implicature can
be ignored or cancelled. Here I follow more recent literature (e.g., Heim, 1991;
Sauerland, 2002; Fox, 2007; Katzir, 2008; Magri, 2009) in treating certain instan-
tiations of such reasoning as inviolable grammatical constraints. Katzir (2007)
argues in particular that structural complexity is at play in the selection of alter-
natives in scalar implicatures: alternatives that are more structurally complex
than the utterance itself are ruled out by the grammar and do not play a role in
evaluating implicatures.7
7Katzir’s definition of structural complexity is much more sophisticated than what is needed
here. The relevant part here is his notion of assessing relative complexity based on deletion: a
structure φ is strictly more complex than a structure ψ if we can transform φ into ψ via a finite
series of deletions.
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What I am suggesting here is that a sentence like John is tall and alleged is ruled
out because the presence of alleged contributes structure without changing the
denotation. This will have the effect of ruling out not only any sentence in which
the sole predicate is trivial, but any structure that contains a trivial predicate
within it.
(102) Structural Economy Constraint
∗φ containing a predicate F if ∀x1, x2 ∈ De.F(x1) = F(x2) and ∃ψ.[[ φ ]] =
[[ ψ ]] and ψ is less structurally complex than φ
2.8 Group III adjectives and the Operator
Before moving on, I return briefly to the Group III adjectives—those which ap-
pear in predicate position but not prenominally, including awake, asleep, and
alive. I assume that they have type ν and can thus appear in predicate position
without requiring further intervention. They share similar morphology, and it
is conceivable that the prefix a is an instantiation of Op.
(103) a. John is asleep.
b. [[ asleep ]] = λx.λw. x is asleep in w
c. [[ John is asleep ]] = [[ asleep ]] ([[ John ]]) = λw. John is asleep in w
They are restricted from prenominal position simply because their occur-
rence there would result in a type mismatch (indicated by the exclamation point
in the following tree).
(104) a. John is an asleep person.
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I will have nothing more to say about these adjectives here.
2.9 Additional Implications
The proposal so far consists of a type-shifting operator that allows adjectives of
type < ν, ν > to appear in predicate position and a constraint on trivial predica-
tion.
I have proposed that the following machinery is part of the grammar:
1. an operator that combines with adjectives of type < ν, ν > and allows them
to occur in predicate position
2. a constraint on trivial predication that rules out any resulting predicate if
it is a constant function
3. a constraint that rules out structures containing trivial predicates
The constraint on trivial predication helps us address the problem of adjec-
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tive distribution, but it must be carefully examined. What are its implications?
The claim that any trivial predicate—not only those which result from combin-
ing our operator with a Group II adjective—is banned by the grammar raises
predictions.
Where else might we see evidence of the constraint on trivial predication?
The verb exist comes immediately to mind, as does the adjective real. Both can
appear as predicates.
(105) a. Unicorns exist.
b. These diamonds are real.
In order for our analysis to hold, the constraint must hold. On close inspec-
tion, we will see that neither ‘exist’ nor predicative ‘real’ is a constant function.
In fact, they are both ambiguous, and for each neither of the two possible mean-
ings is a constant function.8
2.9.1 Is ‘Exist’ a trivial predicate?
At first, the verb ‘exist’ seems to be a potential case of trivial predication. But as
Milsark (1974) points out, the verb is actually ambiguous:
(106) Some unicorns exist.
Milsark notes that this sentence is ambiguous with the following two possi-
ble interpretations:
8For extensive discussion of various perspectives on the nature of the predicate denoted by
exist see Miller (2009), which considers the opinions of Aristotle, Frege, and Quine on the subject,
among many others.
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(107) a. There are a number of individual unicorns whose existence is as-
sertable.
b. The class of unicorns has at least one member.
The interpretation of exist in (107a) he refers to as Exist-I. It asserts that cer-
tain individuals are in existence. That in (107b) he labels Exist-C. It asserts that
a particular class of individuals is instantiated, containing at least one member.
Since the predicate ‘exist’ is ambiguous between Exist-I and Exist-C, but both
meanings can apparently occur in predicate position, we need to examine both
to see that neither is a constant function.
(108) a. [[ exist-I ]] = λx. x exists
b. [[ exist-C ]] = λFν.∃ x. s.t. F(x)
As we can see from the lexical entries, Exist-C quantifies over classes, where
Exist I quantifies over individuals. The two derivations of (106) will differ in that
some unicorns in the exist-I interpretation will operate as a real generalized quan-
tifier taking a VP, exist-I, as an argument; in the exist-C interpretation [[ exist-c ]]
has the type of a generalized quantifier and takes the predicate ‘unicorns’ as its
argument, deriving roughly the same truth conditions as we would get for the
generic sentence Unicorns exist.
Neither version of exist is a constant function in the sense discussed above.
They both distinguish among their arguments. For exist-C, an argument will
only return true if it is a class with at least one member. This is clearly not
going to be true of all classes (or at least not trivially). For exist-I, the predicate
distinguishes between those members of a class that are instantiated and those
that are not.
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2.9.2 What about the adjective ‘real’?
Real is also ambiguous. It can mean ‘non-imaginary’, in which function it is sim-
ilar to the predicate ‘exist’; or it can mean ‘non-fake’, i.e. ‘genuine’ or ‘authentic’.
Working lexical entries for real are as follows:
(109) a. [[ real1 ]] = λFν.λx.λw. F(x)(w) and x exists in w
b. [[ real2 ]] = λFν.λx.λw. F(x)(w) and x is real in w in a given context C9
Note that the sentence ‘Some unicorns are real’ does not have the same am-
biguous interpretation as (106) above. It can only have the exist-I interpretation,
which says that there are individual unicorns that exist. The generic sentence
‘Unicorns are real’, on the other hand, has the exist-C interpretation.
But the sentence ‘Some unicorns are real’ is ambiguous in a different way.
Because we know that unicorns do not exist, this will be easier to see with a
different example. Let’s use the following instead:
(110) Some diamonds are real.
The sentence is ambiguous between the interpretation that some diamonds
are not imaginary , i.e. they actually exist in the world, and the interpretation
that some diamonds are genuine (while presumably others are fake.) The for-
mer interpretation would be natural in a context where, for example, a story
existed about a made-up diamond that weighed twenty pounds. In such a case,
we might say ‘The diamond in that story is not real, but the Hope Diamond is
9For now we can use these lexical entries for real only to show the abstract difference between
the two meanings of the adjective. I will return to the role of context in the discussion of the
adjective fake below.
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real.’ For the other interpretation, we can imagine two stones of which one is
a genuine diamond and the other a fake, in which context we might say ‘The
diamond on the right is real, but the one on the left is fake.’ In both cases, we
can see that the adjectival predicate is not a constant function: it succeeds in
distinguishing between arguments in a meaningful way.
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CHAPTER 3
SOME PROPERTIES OF NATURAL LANGUAGE ADJECTIVES
My primary goal in this chapter will be to address the problem of restricting
adjectival functions of type < ν, ν > to those that actually occur in natural lan-
guage. This is the glob problem mentioned in chapter 1, and it has been raised
as an objection to any proposal that allows adjectives to have < ν, ν > as their
basic type. It is thus an important obstacle for the current proposal to clear. I
will argue that all adjectives we do find in natural language share a common
logical property that distinguishes them from other possible functions of type
< ν, ν >. The inspiration for the approach comes from a property of Generalized
Quantifiers (GQs) discussed by Barwise and Cooper (1981).
3.1 Review of Generalized Quantifiers
I begin with a brief review of the logical properties of Generalized Quantifiers
(GQs), as discussed by Barwise and Cooper (1981). Note that the types used in
this part of the discussion are not intensional—this could easily be revised to
maintain consistency throughout this work, but I will abstract away from inten-
sionality for the moment to be consistent with Barwise and Cooper’s original
discussion instead.
A GQ consists of a determiner and a noun. A few examples follow:
(111) a. every man
b. some people
c. all books
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The determiner in each case has type <<e,t>, <<e,t>,t>> and takes the noun
as its argument:
(112) [[ every ]] ([[ man ]]) = λFet.λGet.∀xe s.t. F(x)→ G(x) (λx.x is a man)
= λGet∀x s.t. x is a man → G(x)
(113) [[ some ]]([[ people ]]) = λFet.λGet.∃xe s.t. F(x) ∧G(x) (λx.x is a person)
= λGet∃x s.t. x is a person ∧G(x)
(114) [[ all ]]([[ books ]]) = λFet.λGet.∀xe s.t. F(x)→ G(x) (λx.x is a book)
= λGet∀x s.t. x is a book → G(x)
The GQ then takes a VP as its argument:
(115) [[ Every man eats ]] = [[ every man ]]([[ eats ]])
= λGet∀x s.t. x is a man → G(x) (λx.x eats)
= ∀x s.t. x is a man → x eats
(116) [[ Some people smoke ]] = [[ some people ]]([[ smoke ]])
= λGet∃x s.t. x is a person ∧G(x) (λx.x smokes)
= ∃x s.t. x is a person ∧ x smokes
(117) [[ All books are made of paper ]] = [[ all books ]]([[ made of paper ]])
= λGet∀x s.t. x is a book → G(x) (λx.x is made o f paper)
= ∀x s.t. x is a book → x is made o f paper
Another way of looking at this, in terms of sets, is that generalized quanti-
fiers pick out sets of sets of individuals. The GQ every man picks out all the VPs
that denote actions performed by every man. Since a VP is a set of individuals
who perform the action denoted by the verb, the GQ every man effectively picks
66
out the set of sets of individuals that contain every man in the given model as
members.
3.2 The Glob Problem
I return now to the problem of constraining functions of type < ν, ν > that can
occur as adjectives. This problem, which has been raised by Heim, faces any
proposal about adjective types in which at least some adjectives have < ν, ν > as
their basic type. The question is: if an adjective can have the type < ν, ν >, why
can’t just any function of that type occur as an adjective? Why, for example, do
we not find adjectives like glob, defined as follows?
(118) [[ glob ]] = λFet. λxe. ∀ye s.t. F(y)→ x likes y.
Glob is a function from sets of individuals to sets of individuals. It picks out
the individuals from one set that like the individuals from another set.
(119) a. John is a glob books. (meaning: John likes books.)
b. Many children are glob candy. (meaning: many children like candy)
c. That glob chocolate ate the whole cake. (meaning: someone who
likes chocolate ate the whole cake)
Glob occurs prenominally, and it has the right type to occupy the same posi-
tion as any prenominal adjective, making these hypothetical sentences perfectly
interpretable.
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Yet we never see an adjective like glob. Why not? What’s wrong with it?
Although the sentences are made-up, it is easier to impose on the nonce-
adjective glob a different kind of meaning. We are tempted, instead of taking
the sentence John is a glob chocolate to mean that John likes chocolate, to take it to
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mean that John is some kind of chocolate. Of course, that is an odd interpreta-
tion in any event, but try this sentence instead:
(121) Flipper is a glob whale.
Here it is much easier to imagine that the intended meaning of the sentence
is that Flipper is some kind of whale, which is a perfectly plausible state of af-
fairs. In fact it’s far easier to imagine that meaning to be correct than to interpret
the sentence using the actual meaning of glob. We have trouble interpreting an
adjective that maps one function of type ν to another of the same type when
the meaning of the adjective is that individuals in the denotation of one of the
functions like individuals in the denotation of the other. It is much easier, by
contrast, to imagine that a function of this kind (i.e., an adjective) maps indi-
viduals in the denotation of one function onto individuals in the denotation of the
same function. It is easier to imagine that a glob whale is some kind of whale than
to imagine it to be an individual who likes whales.
As a preliminary conclusion, it seems possible that the reason why glob and
other adjectives do not occur in natural language, and the reason why a hypo-
thetical adjective of that kind is so difficult to interpret, is that natural language
adjectives of type < ν, ν > must be subsective. I.e., the reason why it’s easier to
imagine that a glob chocolate is a kind of chocolate is because that’s what we’re
used to: we are accustomed to adjectives picking out some members of a set
from within that set. This is how we conceive of adjectival modification. The
absence of glob-type adjectives (as well as the difficulty of interpreting nonce-
versions of them) may be due to a constraint that does exactly what we have
been looking for: it restricts the functions of type < ν, ν > that can occur as ad-
jectives.
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The idea that at least some adjectives are subsective is by no means novel.
Subsection (and intersection, which is a special case of subsection in which both
sets have a portion that does not overlap with the other set) has long been dis-
cussed as a property of adjectives. In chapter 1 I mentioned the adjective skillful.
Skillful is often taken to be subsective, a characterization which is easy to under-
stand from the following use of the adjective.
(122) I know he’s a doctor, but is he a skillful doctor?
This is a perfectly acceptable utterance asking whether a particular individ-
ual who is known to belong to the set of doctors also belongs to the subset of
that set that contains only skillful doctors. There are many other examples, but
interpreting most Group I adjectives as subsective is generally not difficult.
Group II adjectives, on the other hand, present something of a problem. In
fact, they have often been categorized in the literature specifically as being ‘non-
subsective’. Statements that use them in standard subsective ways, like the one
using skillful above, are odd. Note the following contrast, for example:
(123) a. Of all the doctors in the room, please pick out the skillful doctors.
b. ?? Of all the murderers in the room, please pick out the alleged mur-
derers.
The standard conclusion from evidence of this kind is that the Group II ad-
jectives cannot possibly be subsective.
There is also a set of Group I adjectives that have often been taken to be
conclusively non-subsective. These are the privative adjectives—words like fake.
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For example, in the phrase fake gun, how can fake possibly be taking a subset
of guns when it’s picking out exactly those things that are not guns? In other
words, on the assumption that a fake gun is not a gun, fake cannot be subsective.
In addition to these challenges, there is a possible objection to the particular
example of a glob-type adjective used here, namely that it introduces argument
structure within the semantics (vs. the syntax) and would therefore be ungram-
matical regardless of any adjective-specific constraint in the grammar.
To address all of these issues, I’ll speculate about a possible connection be-
tween adjectives and determiners. I begin with a digression to review the details
of the property ’lives on’ noted by Barwise and Cooper as belonging to all GQs,
then return to what I suggest may be a parallel property of natural language
adjectives.
3.3 Conservativity and the Property ‘Lives On’
Barwise and Cooper talk about the question of whether a given GQ ‘lives on’
the predicate denoted by the noun within it. The property ‘lives on’ is defined
as follows:
(124) A quantifier Q lives on a (one-place) predicate A if Q is a set of (one-place)
predicates with the property that, for any predicate X denoting a subset
of De, (the set denoted by) X ∈ Q iff (X ∩ A) ∈ Q.
In simpler terms, a GQ lives on the noun within it if, for any VP, VP is a
member of the GQ if and only if the intersection between the VP and the noun
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is in the GQ. So the only way a VP can be taken as the argument of a GQ with
this property and return TRUE is if it is also the case that every member of the set
derived from intersecting that VP with the noun in the GQ would also return
TRUE if taken as an argument of the GQ. For example, The quantifier all men
lives on the predicate [[ men ]] iff for any VP that returns TRUE when combined
with all men, the intersection between the set of men and the VP would also
return true. I will use a simplified model to illustrate how this works:
(125) In the model Q, the following sets are exhaustive:
[[ men ]] = {John, Matthew, Mike}
[[ smoke ]] = {Matthew, Mike}
[[ own pets ]] = {John, Matthew, Mike}
The sentence All men smoke is thus false for Q. Let’s use this information to
check informally whether the GQ all men lives on the predicate [[ men ]]:
(126) a. A quantifier Q lives on a (one-place) predicate A if Q is a set of (one-
place) predicates with the property that, for any predicate X denoting
a subset of De, (the set denoted by) X ∈ Q iff (X ∩ A) ∈ Q.
b. The quantifier all men lives on the predicate men if for any VP, [[ VP ]]
∈ [[ all men ]]↔ [[ VP ∩men ]] ∈ [[ all men ]]
c. Taking the VP smoke first, we can see that the left side of the bicon-
ditional is not satisfied: it is not the case that all men smoke, so it
is not the case that [[ smoke ]] ∈ [[ all men ]]. The right side of the
biconditional should, then, be false.
d. The right side reads [[ smoke ]] ∩ [[ men ]] ∈ [[ all men ]]. The inter-
section between the VP and the noun is the set of men who smoke
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(namely, the set containing Matthew and Mike as members). Is the
set of men who smoke in [[ all men ]]? No: it is not the case that all
men smoke. Thus both sides of the biconditional are false.
(127) a. The quantifier all men lives on the predicate men if for any VP, [[ VP ]]
∈ [[ all men ]]↔ [[ VP ∩men ]] ∈ [[ all men ]]
b. Now taking the VP own pets, we can see that the left side of the bi-
conditional is satisfied: it is the case that all men own pets, so it is
the case that [[ own pets ]] ∈ [[ all men ]]. The right side of the bicon-
ditional should also be true.
c. The right side reads [[ own pets ]] ∩ [[ men ]] ∈ [[ all men ]]. The in-
tersection of the VP and the noun is the set of men who own pets,
which is an element of the quantifier.
Barwise and Cooper point out that natural language quantifiers always have
this property.
It is sometimes more intuitive to deal with the more familiar concept of con-
servativity in natural language determiners than the less familiar ’lives on’.
Keenan and Stavi (1986) used the term ‘conservative’ to refer to a determiner
that, when it combines with a noun to form a GQ, always forms a GQ that lives
on the property denoted by the noun. A formal definition of conservativity is
as follows:
(128) A determiner D is conservative if, for any (one-place) predicate N and
any VP ⊂ De, VP ∈ D(N) iff (N∩VP) ∈ D(N)
A standard way to test whether a determiner is conservative or not is to
consider the validity of any statement of the following form:
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(129) D N VP↔ D N are N ∩ VP
Translating the above into the frame sentence of the form ‘D N VP if and only
if D N are N that VP’, we can implement the test for a few familiar determiners:
(130) a. All whales swim↔ all whales are whales that swim: TRUE
b. Some whales swim↔ some whales are whales that swim: TRUE
c. No whales swim↔ no whales are whales that swim: TRUE
It is relatively easy to conceptualize a made-up counter-example: something
that is a determiner in form and type but is not conservative. Consider the
made-up determiner brill. Brill has the following denotation:
(131) [[ brill ]] = λNet. λ Met. | N | = 2 ∗ | M |
Brill is not conservative, but this can be difficult to judge intuitively using
the test above.
(132) Brill whales swim↔ brill whales are whales that swim.
However, we can prove that brill is a non-conservative determiner by trans-
lating the sentence ‘Brill whales swim if and only if brill whales are whales that
swim’ into more familiar terms.1 I’ll begin with the left side of the biconditional.
(133) [[ brill whales swim ]] = [[ brill ]] ([[ whale ]])([[ swim ]])
= [λNet.λMet. | N |= 2∗ | M | (λx.x is a whale)](λy.y swims)
1Brill is a determiner in that it has the same type as other determiners, denoting a logical
relationship between two one-place predicates.
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= λMet. | the set A o f all whales |= 2∗ | M | (λy.y swims)
= | the set A o f all whales |= 2∗ | the set B o f individuals that swim |
The left side of the biconditional, then, means roughly ‘There are twice as many
whales as there are individuals that swim.’ Now to the right side.
(134) [[ brill whales are whales that swim ]] = [[ brill ]]([[ whale ]])([[ whales that swim ]])
= [λNet.λMet. | N |= 2∗ | M | (λx.x is a whale)](λy.y is a whale and y swims)
= λMet. | the set A o f all whales |= 2∗ | M | (λy.y is a whale and y swims)
= | the set A o f all whales |= 2∗ | the set B o f individuals that are whales that swim |
The right side, then, means that ‘There are twice as many whales as their are
whales that swim’. Put even more simply, we can say ‘Exactly half of the whale
population swims’.
So the question is whether the following statement is valid: There are twice
as many whales as there are individuals that swim if and only if exactly half of
the whale population swims.’ To see that the statement is not valid, consider
the model L.
(135) L:
De = {whale1, whale2, whale3, whale4, person1, person2, person3,
person4}
[[ whale ]] = {whale1, whale2, whale3, whale4}
[[ swim ]] = {whale1, whale2, person1, person2, person3, person4}
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The biconditional does not hold true in L. The left side is false, but the right
side is true. So brill is not conservative.
Although it was unnatural to conceptualize, we are able to conceive of and
reason about a non-conservative determiner (and thereby a GQ, ‘brill whales’,
that does not live on its noun ‘whale’). It is clear that such a determiner is
not to be found in natural language. Conservativity can be stated as a genuine
constraint: all natural language determiners are conservative, and all GQs live
on the property denoted by the noun they contain.
I would like to suggest that there may be a parallel constraint on adjectives.
Is it possible that all natural language adjective + modified noun combinations
must ‘live on’ the property denoted by the noun?
3.4 A Parallel Constraint on Adjectives
Can we use extend the definition of ‘lives on’/conservativity to posit a parallel
constraint on adjectives?
To repeat the formal definition of ‘lives on’:
(136) A quantifier Q<et,t> lives on a (one-place) predicate Aet if Q is a set of
(one-place) predicates with the property that, for any predicate Xet de-
noting a subset of De, the set denoted by Xet ∈ Q iff (X ∩ A) ∈ Q
The version of this definition I propose for adjective-noun combinations fol-
lows:
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(137) An adjective-noun combination J lives on the property denoted by the
noun if, for any X ∈ De, X ∈ [[ J ]]→ X ∈ [[ N ]]
A determiner is viable in natural language if, in combination with a noun, it
forms a GQ that lives on that noun. I propose that an adjective is viable in nat-
ural language if, in combination with a noun, it forms a unit that lives on that
noun according to the definition above. If this is so, we may have a response to
the glob objection, allowing us to maintain that Group I and II adjectives have
type < ν, ν > with impunity. Note that this constraint suggests that adjectives
must have a property that is something like the more familiar property of sub-
sectiveness. As mentioned above, though, both Group I privative adjectives and
Group II adjectives in general have standardly been taken to be non-subsective.
I will argue that these potentially problematic cases are not counterexamples to
the ‘lives on’ constraint for adjectives, but rather reinforcing evidence that the
constraint is a move in the right direction.
3.5 ‘Privative Adjectives’: Fake, etc.
A privative adjective like fake gets its name from the idea that, when combined
with a noun, it picks out a subset of the complement of the set denoted by the
noun. If this were the case for fake, then any individual belonging to the set
denoted by fake gun could never belong to the set denoted by [[ gun ]], and a pri-
vative adjective would by its meaning violate the lives-on constraint just pro-
posed. This conclusion, though, leads to independent problems discussed in
recent work by Partee (in particular, Partee, 2007).
The first problem with assigning fake a truly privative interpretation is re-
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lated to the problem of interpreting ‘real’ as non-trivial, even prenominally. If
fake is truly privative, what are we to make of the following sentences? They
seem to be contradictory and tautologous, respectively.
(138) This gun is a fake gun.
(139) This gun is a real gun.
Yet both of these utterances can be used informatively by someone trying to
demonstrate the difference between the two kinds of guns. In addition, referring
to fake guns and real guns as ‘kinds of guns’ seems perfectly natural. So the first
question about privative adjectives is: what non-trivial interpretation can they
possibly have, even prenominally?
Partee notes various other adjectival interpretations that can be problematic
in a similar way. For example, she asks how we can interpret the phrase stone
lion (referring to a sculpture of a lion, e.g.). If we take a certain interpretation of
the noun lion, then there are no members of the denotation that are also in the
denotation of stone. Thus in effect, in such situations, we have the same problem
as with fake: we can’t reasonably compose the adjective with the noun, but we
can use the combination perfectly naturally and meaningfully.
Partee’s approach is to claim that privative adjectives like fake, as well as cer-
tain other adjectives like real and exceptional uses of adjectives like stone in stone
lion, ‘coerce’ the denotation of the nouns they modify to include both positive
and negative examples. In other words, modifying a noun with an adjective of
this kind directly affects the way the denotation of the noun is construed in that
context. As such, she claims, these adjectives are subsective: they shift the deno-
tation of the noun they modify and then pick out a subset from the set denoted
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by the noun.
The idea of coercing the denotation of a noun presumably relies on the
noun’s receiving an intensional interpretation to begin with. Since we have been
assuming an intensional interpretation for nouns all along, privative adjectives
fit perfectly into the lives-on constraint proposed here without depending on
any additional notion of coercion.
I would like to suggest that the role of context in determining the scale
against with the fakeness of an entity is to be judged is separate from whatever
mechanism allows the interpretation of a noun to be coerced– or interpreted
intensionally– as needed. Contra Partee, I argue that coercion of some kind
regularly takes place regardless of whether a noun is or is not modified by a
privative adjective (or one like ‘stone’ in the stone lion example). Nouns are in-
terpreted intensionally, and the role that context plays in determining how this
is done is outside the domain of the adjective meaning itself. Discourse context
of some kind, but not the contextual parameter within the meaning of the adjec-
tive itself, plays a role in determining what the intensional gun represents in a
given utterance. The noun in fake gun is interpreted contextually just as it would
be in large gun or concealed gun.
Empirical observations support this line of reasoning. We can just as easily
have a concealed gun in a paintball competition as in a live gunfight. Addition-
ally, the use of the word gun by itself, without any adjectival modification, may
or may not refer to paintball guns, water guns, etc. in addition to the lethal kind.
It is not modification by the adjective fake that determines what does and does
not count as a gun in a given discourse context. Instead, the privative adjective
fake takes the relevant interpretation of the noun and helps us locate it on a scale
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of fakeness specified by a contextual parameter that is part of the meaning of
the adjective. For this reason, a given gun may be fake in some contexts but real
in others while simultaneously qualifying as a gun of some kind in both.
As such, I suggest that the lexical entry for fake might look something like
this:
(140) [[ fake ]] = λF.λx.λw.F(x)(w) and x is fake in w according to a scale specified by context
A fake gun has the property that it is a phony version of some object that can
be construed as representative of that object depending on discourse context.
The lexical entry suggests that fakeness is an independent property, separate
from the matter of a coerced interpretation of the modified noun. This is evident
also from the way we use the adjective. Imagine, for example, walking into an
antique shop and uttering the following:
(141) There are a lot of fake things in this room.
In fact we might even say simply:
(142) This room is full of fakes.
We can use either utterance to refer to fake objects of varying kinds. The
shop might have counterfeit collectible stamps, a faux-wood antique table, etc.
What these objects have in common is that their inclusion in the interpretation
of a noun is highly context-dependent in a precise way. I contend that this is the
quality denoted by fake.
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As to the scalar nature of fake, we can think of a collection of gemstones. If we
are comparing three stones— a diamond, a piece of cubic zirconium, and a piece
of glass cut to look like a gemstone— we can felicitously utter the following:
(143) The cubic zirconium is a fake, but at least it’s not as fake as that piece of
glass. That one’s not even a gemstone!
I will return to the matter of scales and the role of context in adjective mean-
ings in the following section.
3.6 Group II Adjectives and the ‘Lives-On’ Constraint
One of Partee’s concerns in addressing the privative adjective problem is taxo-
nomical: she concludes that all adjectives except the Group II adjectives (which
she terms ‘modal adjectives’) are subsective, and she acknowledges that such a
situation still leaves us with the glob problem. As mentioned above, rather than
argue that all adjectives are subsective per se, I wish to argue that all adjectives,
including Group II adjectives, obey the lives-on constraint.
I face three challenges to such an assertion. The first it to argue that Group
II adjectives have the property ‘lives-on’, which runs counter to many people’s
intuitions about their meaning. The second is to maintain a distinction between
these Group II adjectives and Group I adjectives like fake that leads the former to
be trivialized by combination with the operator and the latter to survive intact
(since the latter, but not the former, appear as predicates) even though they both
conform to the lives-on constraint. The third relates to a potential objection to
the earlier discussion of the glob problem: I must demonstrate that an otherwise
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grammatically viable function of type < ν, ν > is illicit as an adjective since, when
modifying a noun, it forms an adjective-noun combination that fails to live on
the intension of the modified noun.
3.6.1 Group II adjectives live on the nouns they modify
To repeat our lexical entries for alleged and former:
(144) [[ alleged ]] = λF<ν,ν>.λx.λw.∃a s.t. ∀w′ wRaw′ F(x)(w′)
(145) [[ former ]] = λF<ν,ν>.λx.λw.∃w′ < w s.t. F(x)(w′)
Both lexical entries make reference to possible worlds that are not the base
world. For alleged, we have an accessibility relation Ry that gives us the set of
possible worlds w′ that are consistent with what y believes in the base world.
For former, we have a specification w′ < w which allows us to pick out the set
of possible worlds that temporally precedes the base world. Both lexical entries
state that, at least in some possible worlds, the individual has the property de-
noted by the noun. In other words, to interpret alleged we must access a set of
possible worlds in which x is a murderer and check to see whether the set of
possible worlds consistent with a’s allegations in the base world is a subset of
that set. It is paradoxical to claim simultaneously that there are possible worlds
consistent with what a believes in which x is a murderer and that x is not a mur-
derer in any possible world. Likewise for former: in order to be able to access
the set of former presidents, there must be at least some possible worlds in which
x has the property denoted by president. In other words, the intension of the
noun murderer or former, respectively, must contain x as a member.
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What these Group II adjectives do, then, is precisely to denote functions that
live on intensions of the nouns they modify. For example, [[ alleged murderer ]]
picks out the subset of possible-world-murderers who are murderers in the al-
legation worlds of a particular person (as accessed from the base world). What
former president does is pick out those individuals who, in some time prior to
the base time, were presidents. Thus the functions conform perfectly to our con-
straint, though they arguably rely more heavily on access to possible worlds
than do most Group I adjectives.
3.6.2 The role of context in adjective meanings
I have just argued that both privative adjectives and Group II adjective conform
to the lives-on constraint for adjectives proposed above. But privative adjectives
are viable as predicates, where Group II adjectives are not. In order for the argu-
ments here to hold, it must be the case that, when a privative Group I adjective
like fake combines with the operator, the result is not a constant function. This
must stand in contrast to the result when a Group II adjective combines with
the operator and does output a constant function.
Before going any further, let’s confirm via intuition that the predicate fake is
not a constant function. It is possible, again looking at a chunk of cubic zirco-
nium, to state the following two sentences felicitously:
(146) a. That is a fake diamond.
b. That is not a fake gemstone.
In predicate position, we can do the same given the same situation:
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(147) a. That diamond is fake.
b. That gemstone is not fake.
The predicate fake thus does choose between arguments and is not a constant
function.
Let’s examine what happens to fake and alleged when they combine with our
operator:
(148) a. [[ Op ]]([[ fake ]])
= [λA<ν,ν>.λxe.λws.A(λye.λvs.1)] (λF.λxe.λws.F(x)(w) in a context C and x is fake in w)
= λxe.λws. 1 and x is fake in w
b. [[ Op ]]([[ alleged ]]
=[λA<ν,ν>.λxe.λws.A(λye.λvw.1)] (λF<ν,ν>.λxe.λws.∃a s.t. ∀w′ wRaw′ F(x)(w′))
= λxe.λws.∃a s.t.∀w wRaw′. 1
The resulting predicate alleged is trivial since it is a constant function. The re-
sulting predicate fake, however, is still able to meaningfully distinguish between
arguments, as it does in sentences like, e.g., That diamond is fake.
What is it about the meaning of ‘fake’ that causes it, but not ‘alleged’, to
combine happily with the operator? I would like to argue that the relevant dis-
tinction is the role of context in the respective lexical entries of the two types of
adjectives. Kennedy (1997) discusses extensively the relationship between ad-
jective meanings and scales. For many adjectives—sometimes known as grad-
able adjectives—it makes sense to consider the adjective meaning as denoting
some relationship between the noun being modified and a given position on a
scale. Depending on context, the scale might look slightly different. To give a
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familiar example of the outcome, note the following pair of sentences:
(149) a. My nephew is a tall third-grader.
b. My uncle is a tall basketball player.
A tall third grader will probably not be nearly as tall as a tall basketball player,
though both nouns can be modified by tall and the resulting predicate can be
predicated truthfully of the right individual. If we make a complete scale of all
entities in the universe according to their tallness, the basketball player and the
third grader will both be on the scale, but they will be nowhere near one another.
Thus in each sentence the context must direct us to the appropriate use of the
adjectival scale in order for us to evaluate the truth value. Kennedy reviews
two broad lines of thinking about how this might work. In the first, the role
of context is to direct us to the appropriate portion of the scale. In the second,
context tells us where on the scale to set our ‘standard’ marker, so that in that
context everything below the standard is not tall and everything above it is tall.
Either way, the contribution of context to the interpretation of the adjective itself
is to indicate how the comparison class should be set.
I contend that this role of callibrating a comparison class is the only role
which context plays in adjective meanings. Additional roles of context in dis-
course containing adjectives may be much broader. For example, in the case of
a so-called ‘non-linear’ adjective like good, discourse context may play a role in
determining which version of the adjective is in use: the one with a scale that
ranks people by how good they are as doctors? as football players? as peo-
ple? But the role of context within the adjective meaning itself is limited to the
manipulation (either by excerpting or by moving the standard) of a given scale.2
2In this way, an approach based on Kennedy and others along the same lines addresses
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Group II adjectives do not involve comparison classes: they have no scales,
and their lexical entries make no reference to context. We don’t set a standard or
determine a comparison class: there is no independent property of alleged-ness
that can sensibly be called scalar. Instead, we make a non-scalar assessment
about all murderers in every possible world to evaluate the truth value of the
predicate formed by the adjective-noun combination.
The same is true, e.g., for former. Context may play a role in the discourse—
e.g., setting the utterance time to establish temporal order—but it has no role
to play in the meaning of the adjective itself. A president is not either former
or not former depending on his position in some comparison class consisting of
things that are former. Instead, his presidency may be former or not depending
on the larger discourse context (e.g., the utterance time, which is external to the
meaning of the adjective).
Note that the fact that Group II adjectives are non-gradable falls out natu-
rally under this view.
It is important to add that I reject the notion that any contextual parameter
specified within the adjective’s lexical entry plays a role in, e.g., picking out
the relevant individuals whose ‘allegation worlds’ should be considered in the
interpretation of the adjective ‘alleged’. The adjective itself requires only that
for some individual the allegation holds. Any pragmatic knowledge of whose
allegations are relevant to the discourse (e.g., only those of sane people; only
Siegel’s empirical problem from Chapter 1. The reason why an adjective like good is sometimes
two-way ambiguous (what Kennedy calls ‘vague’ and at other times fully indeterminate (what
Siegel calls ‘vague’) is that such an adjective has multiple scales available. However we con-
ceive of the relationship between these multiple scales ranking individuals according to their
goodness at various things (soccer, virtue, fathering), the role of the contextual parameter within
the adjective itself is to constrain the portion of the scale considered or to set the standard ap-
propriately, not to tell us which scale is relevant for the larger utterance.
86
those of people familiar with the relevant facts; only groups of two or more
people) enters at a higher level than the interpretation of the adjective itself.
In other words, a Group II adjective is interpreted in the same way in every
context, but (as is generally the case) in the context of a given discourse we
ignore irrelevant implications of the interpretation. (E.g., in the case of ‘alleged’
we might, during most conversations, ignore the allegations of the insane.)
We have seen, then, how it is possible that both fake and alleged conform to
the lives-on constraint, while of the two only fake survives combination with
the operator to form a viable predicate, since only fake denotes an independent
property that can be evaluated without direct reference to the interpretation of
the modified noun.
3.6.3 Glob does not live on the noun it modifies
We are left with potential challenges to the details of the way the glob problem
has been presented. Glob clearly violates the lives-on constraint, since an indi-
vidual can be a glob books without being a book, but it must also be clear that glob
is ruled out for this reason and not for independently violating some separate
grammatical restriction. An argument against drawing any conclusions about
the glob problem based on the standard glob example adopted above is that, in
introducing argument structure within the semantics rather than the syntax, it is
inherently ungrammatical regardless of any specific constraints on the seman-
tics of adjectives.3 Following is another example of glob, which we can call glob′,
and which does not introduce argument structure in the semantics:
3Thanks to John Whitman for pointing out this challenge to the original example.
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(150) [[ glob′ ]] = λFν.λx.λw.F(x)(w) or x is big in w
Glob ′ does not live on the noun it modifies, since it does not follow that if x
is an element of the set denoted by glob′ noun then x is also a member of the set
denoted by the noun itself.
As to demonstrating that no glob exists which both does conform to the lives-
on constraint and does not constitute a viable adjectival function in natural lan-
guage, I am unable to find such an example at this time but of course do not rule
out that such a function is conceivable. However, to maintain the arguments
here it is necessary to show that those functions of type < ν, ν > that violate the
constraint are not viable natural language adjectives, and not vice versa. If some
function of that type conforms to the constraint but is nevertheless absent from
natural language, that may or may not be the result of an accidental gap but
should not directly weaken the argument here.
3.7 Trivial predication in there-expletives
There is a third discussion in Barwise and Cooper (1981) to which I believe the
current proposal may be relevant: their analysis of the definiteness restriction in
there-existentials (a puzzle also discussed by Kuno (1971), Jenkins (1972), Stow-
ell (1978), Williams (1984), Zucchi (1995), McNally (1998), Keenan (2003), and
Francez (2007), among many others). To review the relevant data:
(151) a. There is a man in the garden.
b. There are some men in the garden.
c. There are men in the garden.
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d. * There is the man in the garden.
e. * There is every man in the garden.
The phenomenon illustrated by this data has become known as the definite-
ness restriction because definite DPs are restricted from there-expletives. On
closer inspection, though, the exact characterization of the group of DPs that
are restricted from there-expletives is more complex. Barwise and Cooper con-
tend that the DPs that cannot occur in there-expletives are exactly those that are
most difficult to construe as trivial (a property of GQs to be discussed in detail
in the following section). They call these the strong determiners and provide the
following definition:
(152) A determiner D is positive strong (or negative strong, respectively) if for
every model M = 〈E, [[ ]]〉 and every A ⊆ E, if the quantifier [[ D ]](A) is
defined then A ∈ [[ D ]](A). (Or A < [[ D ]](A), respectively.) If D is not
positive or negative strong then D is weak.
Or, simplified:
(153) A determiner is strong if a statement of the form D N is an N/are Ns is ei-
ther automatically valid or contradictory. If the validity of the statement
is contingent, D is weak.
For example,
(154) a. All men are men: automatically valid regardless of model; all is a
strong determiner
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b. Neither man is a man: automatically contradictory regardless of
model; neither is a strong determiner
c. Some men are men: model contingent; some is a weak determiner
They intentionally use the terms strong and weak to recall the work of Milsark
(1974) on there-existentials, in which the author refers to those determiners that
can appear in the construction as weak and those that cannot as strong. Having
created a formal definition for the two categories of determiner, Barwise and
Cooper use the definition to formulate their version of the definiteness restric-
tion, which relies on the following semantic interpretation of there-existentials:
A sentence of the form there is/are NP can be interpreted as mean-
ing that the set of individuals in the model (E) is a member of the
quantifier denoted by the NP.
Barwise and Cooper (1981)
The set of individuals can be seen as a predicate (VP) that denotes all individ-
uals. To use Keenan and Stavi’s terms, it is the universal property that applies
to all individuals in the model. Barwise and Cooper paraphrase it with the verb
exist. Their semantics for there-existentials can be paraphrased as follows:
(155) A there-existential of the form There is/are NP means NP exists
A there-expletive with a strong determiner is ungrammatical for Barwise and
Cooper (1981) because stating that the universal property is in the quantifier is
the same as saying that A is in the quantifier, which is true by definition for
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quantifiers with strong determiners. In other words, when a GQ contains a
strong determiner we already know that the universal property is an element of
the quantifier, and as such a there-existential with a strong determiner is tautol-
ogous.
Barwise and Cooper offer an intuitively sensible semantics for there-
existentials and a simple, elegant approach to the definiteness restriction that
produces viable results. Unfortunately, their analysis backs them into a corner
with respect to syntactic constituency within there-existentials. I believe that, us-
ing the machinery set up here already, we can maintain their semantic analysis
of the construction without having to stick to their awkward syntactic analysis.
For convenience, I will follow Francez (2007) in referring to the NP in a there-
existential as the pivot and all material following the NP as a coda. Barwise and
Cooper, in order to maintain their analysis in the face of the ungrammaticality of
a sentence like There is the man in the garden, must claim that the coda (here in the
garden) is inside the NP. Otherwise the sentence would be redundant (it would
tell us twice that [[ exist ]], or the universal property, is a member of the set
denoted by the GQ) but it wouldn’t be a tautology, since it would also contribute
new information: that [[ in the garden ]] is a member of the set denoted by the
GQ.
In addition to being counterintuitive in the interpretation of many readily
available examples, the idea that the coda must be contained within the pivot
NP had already by the time of Barwise and Cooper (1981)’s writing been argued
against formally by many including Milsark (1974). Milsark, commenting on
analyses of there-expletives that preceded his but kept the coda inside the NP
pivot such as Jenkins (1972), shows that, while parts of NPs usually cannot be
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extracted, coda material can be separated from the pivot via extraction.
(156) a. I talked with a man in a suit of armor.
b. * In a suit of armor I talked with a man.
(157) a. There is a guppy in the drainpipe.
b. In the drainpipe there is a guppy.
(158) a. It’s John at the door.
b. * Where is it John?
(159) a. There’s a salt cellar in the cabinet.
b. Where is there a salt cellar?
Francez (2007) adds that the pivot plus coda combination does not always
have the same distribution as an NP, (data from Francez (2007), p. 34):
(160) a. There are no students who you know enrolled in the class
b. * No students who you know enrolled in the class asked about you.
We have, as part of the working machinery of the present analysis, already
posited a constraint on trivial predication that cannot be sidestepped via the in-
clusion of informative material in the larger structure. Recall the discussion of
the sentence John is tall and alleged in chapter 2. We saw that, although the pred-
icate tall is non-trivial, because the sentence is burdened by the extra structure
of the trivial predicate alleged, which adds structure but no meaning, it is still
ungrammatical.
We can extend this phenomenon to allow ourselves to maintain Barwise and
Cooper’s semantic analysis of there-existentials without having to maintain their
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untenable claim about the constituency of the pivot + coda. To restate their prob-
lem: if the man in the garden were not a single NP, then the sentence shouldn’t
be trivial: although we would learn redundantly that the man exists, we would
also gain the new information that he is in the garden. (If it is a single NP, as they
suggest, then we have learned the trivial information that [DP the [NP man in
the garden]] exists.)
Our constraint on trivial predication, combined with the structural economy
constraint, gives us an alternative. We can maintain Barwise and Cooper’s basic
interpretation of there-existentials, along with their account of the definiteness
restriction, even with the more plausible structure [[D NP] [PP]] for the man in
the garden. The sentence might be salvaged by the non trivial predication that
occurs when the PP takes the DP the man as its argument. But there is a second
predicate, that signified by the universal property, that is trivial and contributes
no additional meaning. On Barwise and Cooper’s interpretation, the sentence
There is the man in the garden violates our structural economy constraint, since it
is equivalent in denotation to the more structurally economical The man is in the
garden.
3.8 Constant Functions and Ungrammaticality
Returning to the discussion of triviality and ungrammaticality in Chapter 2,
above, there is yet another parallel to be drawn- quite speculatively at this point-
between the behavior of adjectives as discussed here and Barwise and Cooper
(1981)’s discussion of generalized quantifiers. Like predicate adjectives, GQs
can be constant functions. My goal here is not to draw any definitive conclu-
93
sions about the relationship between constant functions and ungrammaticality,
but to discuss a potential similarity between two instances of constant functions
in grammar that may indicate room for further research.
Barwise and Cooper (1981) discuss two things that can go wrong when de-
terminers combine with nouns to form GQs. The first, in which the GQ fails to
denote anything, is not particularly relevant here. This occurs when the noun’s
denotation is not in the domain of the determiner. For example, the determiner
both has a highly restricted domain: it contains only sets with exactly two mem-
bers. Additional examples of determiners that have very restricted domains are
the and neither. The has only singleton sets in its domain; neither, like both, has
only sets with exactly two members in its domain.
The other way in which a GQ can go bad is more relevant here. In this type
of failure, the GQ is trivial. This can happen in one of two ways: the denotation
of the DP (a generalized quantifier) can assign TRUE to all VPs (i.e. can pick out
the power set of VPs, written as Pow(E)) or FALSE to all VPs (i.e. can pick out
∅), thereby failing to pick out any subset from the set of VPs. When a GQ does
not fail in this way (in either direction), Barwise and Cooper term it a ‘proper
quantifier’ or a ‘sieve’.
The term ‘sieve’ refers to the ability to distinguish among VP arguments.
A generalized quantifier (GQ) denotes a ‘sieve’ if it picks out some but not all
(and not no) VPs. Interestingly, there are no GQs that are always non-sieves.
Instead, triviality is determined by the model, and the actual failure of these
trivial functions can be difficult to observe directly. The constraint on trivial
predication as formulated in the previous chapter rules out predicates that fail
to pick out some but not all DPs, and this type of triviality is far more visible
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(we can see it, for example, in the simple but bad sentence John is alleged).
In both of these cases of triviality, a constant function is bad. Is there a gen-
eral disinclination toward constant functions in the grammar?
Let’s look at the properties of non-sieve GQs more closely. These are GQs
that, given the model, fail to distinguish among VPs. Two examples from Bar-
wise and Cooper are as follows:
(161) Example of a non-seive GQ that picks out ∅: in a model with no men, the
GQ many men
(162) Example of a non-seive GQ that picks out Pow(E): in a model with no
men, the GQ every man
In other words, in a model with no men, the GQ many men is a non-sieve
because it returns FALSE regardless of what VP it takes as its argument. If there
are no men, there is no action that is performed by many of the non-existent
men. On the other hand, in the same model the GQ every man fails to distin-
guish between VPs in the opposite direction: regardless of the VP it takes as its
argument, it returns TRUE. Since there are no men, it is trivially true that every
man performs every action. There are, of course, many models in which one or
both of these GQs is non-trivial. But regardless of what model we work with,
the two will never switch the direction of their triviality from the model with no
men. Many men will never return TRUE for all VPs, and likewise every man will
never return FALSE for all VPs.
To make a firm comparison between trivial predication and trivial GQs, it
would be necessary to know definitively whether the non-occurence of GQs that
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are always non-sieves, model independently, is principled (as I am contending
the constraint on trivial predication is) or arises from an accidental gap. I have
not succeeded in finding a way to ascertain which is the case. It would also be
useful to compare the result of using a trivial predicate to that of using a non-
sieve GQ, which we can do if we set up the model correctly. Are non-sieve GQs
ungrammatical, or at least anomalous, like trivial predicates? For comparison,
following are a few examples of each phenomenon.
(163) a. John is alleged.
b. That president is former.
c. The events reported are actual.
(164) In a model M which contains no unicorns and no square triangles:
a. Every square triangle is a triangle. (TRUE)
b. Every square triangle is large. (TRUE)
c. Many square triangles are triangles. (FALSE)
d. Many square triangles are large. (FALSE)
e. Every unicorn flies. (TRUE)
f. Every unicorn has a horn. (TRUE)
g. Many unicorns fly. (FALSE)
h. Many unicorns have horns. (FALSE)
The sentences in (163) are clearly not sound, which under the current anal-
ysis results from the fact that their predicates are trivial. The sentences in (164)
do not seem to be bad, but there is something odd about them. They contain
constant functions: each of the GQs returns the same output regardless of what
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VP argument we give it. I would like to be able to compare the oddness of the
sentences in (164) to the anomaly of those in (163). Does the occurrence of a
constant function have the same impact in both cases?
The comparison between the two types of sentences is made difficult by the
fact that the non-sieve GQs are not always constant: given a different model, they
would be perfectly sound sieves. By contrast, the trivial predicates resulting
from the operator’s action on Group II adjectives are impossible to construe as
non-constant functions, regardless of our model. In the absence of an example
of a GQ that is always a non-sieve, regardless of the model, we cannot make a
direct comparison from which to form a firm and general hypothesis about the
status of constant functions in grammar. As such, I am only able to speculate
for now and leave further exploration to future work.
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CHAPTER 4
GREEK DETERMINER SPREADING
4.1 Testing the Proposal on Non-English Data
The goal of this final chapter will be to implement the proposal laid out in the
previous chapters using non-English data. To do so I will look at adjectival
modification in the modern Greek DP. As we will see momentarily, adjectives in
Greek can occur in two different configurations within the DP itself. This con-
trasts with English, in which DP-internal adjectives occur only prenominally.1
In Greek, adjectives can appear in a position that parallels the English prenom-
inal position, but they can also occur in an alternative structure that has been
widely discussed in the literature and is referred to as Determiner Spreading
(or, sometimes, ’Polydefiniteness’).
4.2 Determiner Spreading in Greek
Greek has two configurations for DPs. The first looks similar to the English DP.
The word order is determiner > adjective > noun, and adjectives stack in the
standard order described in Sproat and Shih (1988). DPs with this word order
have been termed ‘monadic’ by Kolliakou (2004). In the second configuration,
adjectives can be prenominal or postnominal, and every postnominal adjective
must be preceded by its own definite article. This phenomenon is referred to as
1Except in exceptional cases, e.g. phrasal modifiers as in the following sentence.
(1) A dog hungry for a good meal will often bark.
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‘Determiner Spreading’ (DS) by Androutsopoulou (1994) or ‘polydefiniteness’
(Kolliakou, 2004). 2
Greek definite DPs can be either monadic or DS:
(165) a. to
the
megalo
big
vivlio
book
‘the big book’
b. * to
the
vivlio
book
megalo
big
‘the big book’
c. to
the
megalo
big
kokkino
red
vivlio
book
‘the big red book’
d. ? to
the
kokkino
red
megalo
big
vivlio
book
‘the red big book’
(166) a. to
the
megalo
big
to
the
kokkino
red
to
the
vivlio
book
2According to some speakers, indefinite DPs also exhibit the word order variations of DS.
Other speakers reject data with varied word order in indefinites. There is no ‘indefiniteness
spreading’: even for speakers who accept varied word order, repetition of the indefinite article
is impossible.
(1) a. ena
a
megalo
big
vivlio
book
‘a big book’
b. ? ena
a
vivlio
book
megalo
big
c. ? ena
a
vivlio
book
megalo
big
kokkino
red
d. * ena
a
megalo
big
ena
a
vivlio
book
‘a big book’
e. * ena
a
vivlio
book
ena
a
megalo
big
‘a big book’
f. * ena
a
vivlio
book
ena
a
megalo
big
ena
a
kokkino
red
‘a big red book’
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‘the big red book’
b. to
the
megalo
big
to
the
vivlio
book
to
the
kokkino
red
‘the big red book’
c. to
the
vivlio
book
to
the
megalo
big
to
the
kokkino
red
‘the big red book’
d. to
the
vivlio
book
to
the
kokkino
red
to
the
megalo
big
‘the big red book’
e. to
the
kokkino
red
to
the
vivlio
book
to
the
megalo
big
‘the big red book’
f. ? to
the
kokkino
red
to
the
megalo
big
to
the
vivlio
book
‘the RED big book’3
What is the syntactic position of the extra determiners? And why is word
order variation possible with DS but not in a monadic DP?
The syntactic aspects of DS have been widely discussed, e.g. by Androut-
sopoulou (1994, 1996), Alexiadou and Wilder (1998), Kolliakou (2004), Lekakou
and Szendro˝i (2007), Larson and Yamakido (2008), Leu (2009), and Katzir (2011).
In many cases, though, these syntactically-oriented analyses have failed to seri-
ously consider the semantics of DS in weighing the viability of different syntac-
tic structures for the construction.
In this chapter I will work primarily with the proposal for DS of Alexiadou
3The word order in (166f) conveys the same special meaning as the Greek monadic DP with
the equivalent adjective ordering (to kokkino megalo vivlio) or its English translation (the RED
big book). The adjectives violate the conventional ordering guidelines (e.g., SIZE > COLOR)
discussed in Sproat and Shih (1988). As in the monadic DP, the unusual adjective ordering is
permissible but marked; the speaker must be referring to an already salient group of big books
and picking out the unique red member of that set.
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and Wilder (1998), which is appealing in many ways but disregards semantic
issues almost completely. I show how our type-shiftng operator affects the dis-
tribution of Group II adjectives in Greek DS.4 I also propose that the structure
of DS includes a separate type-shifting operator that combines with the NP to
enable it to combine with the one-or-more adjectives modifying it. Since the
second type-shifting operator fails to prevent the observed anomaly of Group II
adjectives in DS, I conclude that the first type-shifting operator applies directly
above the merged position of these adjectives and that the second type-shifting
operator comes too late in the structure to salvage them.5
In the course of making this argument, I will also address a number of prob-
lems with Alexiadou and Wilder’s account specifically. First, I eliminate their
full clausal structure from within the DP. They need to merge DS adjectives as
4Some but not all speakers find some but not all Group II adjectives acceptable in DS with
appropriate contrastive focus. The data is elusive and seems to vary highly among speakers.
Nevertheless, the question of how information structure relates to the availability of DS has
been discussed in some of the literature, including among others Ioannidou and den Dikken
(2006) and Lekakou and Szendro˝i (2007). Following is a sampling of the controversial data:
(1) a. # o
the
proighoumenos
former
o
the
prothipourghos
prime-minister
‘the former prime minister’ (from Androutsopoulou (1996))
b. # O
the
proigumenos
former
o
the
prothipurgos
prime-minister
pethane.
died
‘The former prime minister died.’ (from Lekakou and Szendro˝i (2007))
c. # o
the
proedros
president
o
the
proin
former
‘the former president’ (Effi Georgala, p.c.)
d. # o
the
ipotithemenos
alleged
o
the
dholofonos
murderer
‘the alleged murderer’ (Effi Georgala, p.c.; italics indicate contrastive focus)
e. # o
the
dholofonos
murderer
o
the
ipotithemenos
alleged
‘the alleged murderer’ (Effi Georgala, p.c.; italics indicate contrastive focus)
Interestingly, Group II adjectives have also been noted as anomolous in Slavic split-NPs (see
Pereltsvaig (2008) and Partee (2009)), and there too the anomaly can apparently be made more
acceptable through focus.
5All conclusions drawn earlier about the syntactic position of Op, including the restriction
on taking AP in its specifier, apply to the Greek data as well.
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predicates of reduced relatives, following Kayne (1994), in order to exclude the
Group II adjectives from DS. By providing an independent semantic account
of these adjectives’ behavior in DS, I avoid the reduced relative structure al-
together. Second, I eliminate the potential for conflict, acknowledged by the
authors,6 between two movements to A′ positions within their analysis. In my
proposal, one of the two movements is type-driven and the other remains (as in
their analysis) feature-driven, so the two cannot conflict.
4.3 Androutsopoulou
Alexiadou and Wilder (1998) take an approach based on the work of Antonia
Androutsopoulou (Androutsopoulou, 1994 and Androutsopoulou, 1996). Fol-
lowing are the main features of Androutsopoulou’s analysis:
1. A special functional projection, DefP, dominates each NP and AP in a def-
inite DP and hosts the syntactic feature [+def].
2. Def0[+de f ] is spelled out as the definite article
3. semantic definiteness is associated with D0, which occurs only once at the
top of the tree; Def0 is semantically vacuous
4. varied word order results when any given DefP raises to the specifier of
a higher DefP, producing all the desired word orders listed in section 4.2
and no others.7
6See Alexiadou and Wilder (1998), fn.18.
7Androutsopoulou suggests that this is movement to check the definiteness feature, but that
the movement can take place either overtly or covertly
102
Androutsopoulou’s tree for DS is as follows:8
(167) DP
uu
uu
uu
II
II
II
Spec,DP D′
uu
uu
uu
II
II
II
D0
∅
DefP1
uu
uu
uu
II
II
II
Spec,DefP Def′
uu
uu
uu
II
II
II
D0
the
AP
uu
uu
uu
II
II
II
Spec,AP A′
uu
uu
uu
II
II
II
A0
big
DefP2
JJ
p
p
omlkifa[R
D
3
)
"
ﬃ







uu
uu
uu
II
II
II
Spec,DefP Def′
uu
uu
uu
II
II
II
Def0
the
AP
uu
uu
uu
II
II
II
Spec,AP A′
uu
uu
uu
II
II
II
A0
red
DefP3
JJ
p
p
omlkifa[R
D
3
)
"
ﬃ







uu
uu
uu
II
II
II
Spec,DefP Def′
uu
uu
uu
II
II
II
Def0
the
NP
ttt
ttt
tt
JJJ
JJJ
JJ
book
8Despite the way the tree is drawn here, Androutsopoulou remains agnostic as to whether
adjectives are heads or specifiers. She argues that either of these two options is preferable to
making adjectives NP adjuncts, since adjectives seem to exhibit strict ordering restrictions and
there is no principled way to order multiple adjuncts adjoined to the same projection. Note that,
as she points out, Greek does have phrasal adjectives—clearly at least these adjectives cannot
be treated as heads.
103
4.4 Alexiadou and Wilder (1998)
Androutsopoulou analyzes DS as a series of embedded constituents, each
headed by a semantically null element that is pronounced as a copy of the def-
inite article. Alexiadou and Wilder take Androutsopoulou’s structure as their
starting point but make a number of departures from her account. First, they
dispense with the special DefP projection that Androutsopoulou uses to host
the extra determiners in DS on the grounds that it is unmotivated, replacing it
with iterations of DP. Second, they follow Kayne (1994) in generating adjectives
postnominally as the predicates of reduced relative clauses.9 In the resulting
structure, each determiner takes a full CP complement, and each embedded rel-
ative clause takes a DP as subject and an AP as predicate.
In Kayne’s proposal, the adjective is preposed from its merged position as
the predicate of a reduced relative clause to spec CP:10
9Kayne himself revives a much older idea from early generative syntax, cf., e.g., Smith (1961).
10Kayne (1994), chapter 8
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(168) DP
llll
llll
ll
RRRR
RRRR
RR
Spec,DP D′
llll
llll
ll
RRRR
RRRR
RR
D0
the
CP
llll
llll
ll
RRRR
RRRR
RR
Spec,CP C′
llll
llll
ll
RRRR
RRRR
RR
C0 IP
llll
llll
ll
RRRR
RRRR
RR
NP
uu
uu
uu
II
II
II
AP
xx
xx
xx
FF
FF
FF
UU
book yellow
Alexiadou and Wilder claim that Greek DS has a similar structure, with APs
raising to Spec,CP obligatorily but with DPs in Spec,IP, and that the structure
can iterate:11
11See Alexiadou and Wilder (1998), fn.7 for their discussion of the need for DPs, not NPs in
Spec,IP in their structure.
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(169) DP1
llll
llll
ll
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LL
Spec,DP
llll
llll
ll
D
the
CP
llll
llll
ll
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LL
Spec,CP
llll
llll
ll
C IP
lll
lll
lll
lll
lll
lll
lll
lll
lll
l
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LL
llll
llll
ll
DP2
llll
llll
ll
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LL
I AP
qqq
qqq
q
MMM
MMM
M
YY
Spec,DP
llll
llll
ll
big
D
the
CP
llll
llll
ll
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LL
Spec,CP
llll
llll
ll
C IP
lll
lll
lll
lll
lll
lll
lll
lll
lll
l
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LL
llll
llll
ll
DP3
llll
llll
ll
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LL
I AP
qqq
qqq
q
MMM
MMM
M
YY
Spec,DP
llll
llll
ll
red
D
the
NP
qqq
qqq
q
MMM
MMM
M
book
They account for the word-order variation observed in DS by allowing any DP
to optionally raise to the specifier of any higher DP:
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(170) DP1
llll
llll
ll
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LL
Spec,DP
llll
llll
ll
D
the
CP
llll
llll
ll
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LL
Spec,CP
llll
llll
ll
C IP
lll
lll
lll
lll
lll
lll
lll
lll
lll
l
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LL
llll
llll
ll
DP2
QQ
?
<
:
8
6
4
2
0
.
,
+
)
(
&
%
$
"
llll
llll
ll
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LL
I AP
qqq
qqq
q
MMM
MMM
M
YY
Spec,DP
llll
llll
ll
big
D
the
CP
llll
llll
ll
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LL
Spec,CP
llll
llll
ll
C IP
lll
lll
lll
lll
lll
lll
lll
lll
lll
l
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LL
llll
llll
ll
DP3
QQ
?
<
:
8
6
4
2
0
.
,
+
)
(
&
%
$
"
llll
llll
ll
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LL
I AP
qqq
qqq
q
MMM
MMM
M
YY
Spec,DP
llll
llll
ll
red
D
the
NP
qqq
qqq
q
MMM
MMM
M
book
If no DPs raise, we get the basic word order the big the red the book. If DP3 raises
directly to the specifier of DP1, we get the book the big the red; if DP3 raises to the
specifier of DP2 and no further movement takes place, we get the big the book the
red. If DP2 raises to the specifier of DP1 and no other movement takes place, we
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get the red the book the big; if DP3 raises to the specifier of DP2 and then DP2 raises
to the specifier of DP1, we get the book the red the big. The anomalous DS structure
#the red the big the book can only result from the adjectives’ having been merged
initially in the anomalous order red>big (and indeed speakers confirm that the
anomaly of the red the big the book is on par with that of its monadic counterpart
the red big book).
Alexiadou and Wilder are also able to account for the ‘mixed DPs’ some
speakers find acceptable. These are cases where a monadic DP is embedded
within a DS structure.
(171) a. to
the
megalo
big
to
the
kokkino
red
vivlio
book
‘the big red book’
b. to
the
kokkino
red
vivlio
book
to
the
megalo
big
‘the big red book’
Contra Kayne, they maintain that, in addition to the reduced relative source
for prenominal adjectives, such adjectives can alternately be merged between D
and NP.12 Thus a non-DS DP can be embedded within a DS DP, with a ‘mixed
DP’ resulting. For them, monadic DPs are simply the result of merging all the
adjectives in a given DP in this way (i.e. between D and N). Since there are no
embedded DPs in such cases, word order in monadic DPs is fixed.
12This may mean as NP adjuncts or, for those who prefer Cinque-style functional projections
to host adjectives, in either head or specifier of some projection(s) between D and N. The partic-
ular choice does not affect their analysis.
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4.5 Critique of Alexiadou and Wilder (1998)
4.5.1 Group II adjectives in DS
For Alexiadou and Wilder, adjectives in DS are merged as the predicates of rela-
tive clauses. Like some earlier generative linguists who took this as the base
position for prenominal adjectives (see Siegel (1976) for an extensive review
and discussion), but unlike their more recent and direct source for the analysis,
Kayne (1994), they disallow any adjective that would be ungrammatical in this
base position from appearing in the resulting structure even after movement.
Specifically, Alexiadou and Wilder claim that Group II adjectives like alleged
and former, because they cannot appear in the predicate position where DS ad-
jectives are merged, are ungrammatical in DS even though they have undergone
movement to Spec,CP. There are a number of problems with this assumption.
Kayne (1994) generates all adjectives, including, presumably, the Group II
ones, as predicates of relative clauses. As mentioned briefly above, though, no
adjective is allowed to remain in that position. Instead, the AP must raise above
the NP it modifies to the specifier of CP.13 For Alexiadou and Wilder, though,
there must be a stipulative distinction between those adjectives which are made
grammatical by the movement (e.g. yellow) and those which cannot be helped
(e.g. former). Their claim is that Group II adjectives cannot be merged as the
predicates of relative clauses to begin with. But they give no principled reason
why these adjectives cannot be merged there while others, which would also
produce ungrammaticality if allowed to remain there, can be. Instead they must
13In languages like French, where the noun precedes the adjective in the surface word order,
Kayne posits an additional raising of the noun above the adjectives’ landing site.
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reason that, though all adjectives are ultimately bad in that position, some can
be salvaged by raising to Spec,CP while others cannot be.
4.5.2 Moving AP to Spec,CP
A second problem faced by Alexiadou and Wilder’s analysis is the lack of any
apparent motivation for AP to raise to Spec,CP. This they inherit directly from
Kayne, who states explicitly that he ‘has no explanation’ for why the AP can-
not remain in its base position.14 Even if the movement were well-motivated,
though, it leaves Alexiadou and Wilder in the unfortunate position of having
two constituents moving around each other—DP and AP—both into A′ posi-
tions. Their movements must be carefully choreographed to prevent conflict
(and the wrong word order that would result from one goal’s moving to the
other’s target). I will avoid this problem entirely since, though I borrow intact
Alexiadou and Wilder’s ideas about the optional raising of any DP to the spec-
ifier of a higher DP, for me the movement of AP to a higher position in the tree
is not just obligatory but also type-driven.
4.5.3 Determiner scope
Alexiadou and Wilder, like Androutsopoulou, assume that extra copies of the
determiner in DS are expletive. The copy of D0 that has the semantics of definite-
ness associated with it—i.e., the non-expletive copy—is presumably the highest
copy, since its definiteness scopes over the entire DP. But in the event that an-
14Kayne (1994), page 100.
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other DP moves to the specifier of the highest DP—a movement that can happen
in Alexiadou and Wilder’s analysis, as described above—that D0 is no longer
the highest D0 in the tree. Yet it still must be able to take semantic scope over
the entire DP, now including the material in its own specifier. In the analysis I
offer below I will not make any real improvement on Alexiadou and Wilder’s
position with respect to this problem. I will, however, suggest here both for the
benefit of my own analysis and theirs that we assume for now that any moved
DPs are reconstructed at LF to their unmoved positions so that the semantically
definite D0 is interpreted in a position where it scopes over the entire DP, as
desired. Independent evidence for this reconstruction would be reassuring, but
for now I leave it as an assumption.
4.5.4 PPs in DS
One last problem with Alexiadou and Wilder’s approach is that we would ex-
pect to see PP modifiers in DS, since they are licit in (reduced) relative clauses,
but this prediction is not borne out by the data:
(172) a. to
the
vivlio
book
to opio
which
ine
is
pano
on
sto
to-the
rafi
shelf
‘the book which is on the shelf’
b. to
the
vivlio
book
pano
on
sto
to-the
rafi
shelf
‘the book on the shelf’
c. * to
the
vivlio
book
to
the
pano
on
sto
to-the
rafi
shelf
‘the book on the shelf’
d. * to
the
pano
on
sto
to-the
rafi
shelf
to
the
vivlio
book
111
‘the book on the shelf’
This problem will become moot in the current proposal with the elimination of
relative clauses from the DS structure.
4.6 Structure
The examples of application of the operator for predicate adjectives in the ear-
lier chapters were in English, but in Greek the same operator should apply to
any adjective in a predicate position. Although I will not use their full clausal
structure, I will adopt from Alexiadou and Wilder the assumption that DS is a
predicative construction embedded within the DP. Thus an adjective in DS will
need to combine with the operator in order to produce a node with the predica-
tive type, ν. The structure I propose for the DS DP the red the book is as follows:
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(173) DP1
llll
llll
ll
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LL
Spec,DP1P
llll
llll
ll
D01
the+de f
Op2Pν
llll
llll
ll
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LL
Spec,Op2P
llll
llll
ll
Op20<ν,<ν,ν>> XP
lll
lll
lll
lll
lll
lll
lll
lll
lll
l
RRRR
RRRR
RR
Op1Pν
XX
llll
llll
ll
RRRR
RRRR
RR
DP2ν
llll
llll
ll
RRRR
RRRR
RR
Op10<<ν,ν>,ν> AP<ν,ν>
qqq
qqq
q
MMM
MMM
M
D02
‘the’∅de f
NPν
uu
uu
uu
II
II
II
red
book
The lowest DP, which is semantically transparent and inherits the semantics of
the NP it contains, can form a predicative phrase (XP) with Op1P, which con-
tains AP. Op1 is the same type-shifting operator that occurs whenever adjectives
are required to act as predicates. It combines with the adjective, which begins
with type < ν, ν >, to form a predicate with type ν. But Op1P cannot combine
with DP2, which also has type ν. OpP must therefore move to a position where
it can be interpreted.
The phrase structure of DS provides the landing site: the specifier of a projec-
tion above the predicative phrase XP. This position is analogous to Alexiadou
and Wilder’s Spec,CP landing site for AP. But where they have an empty C0
head, I have another type-shifting operator, Op2, which contributes crucially to
the semantics of DS by combining with the DP to form a node of type < ν, ν >
that is sister to Spec,Op2P (which has type ν since it hosts the raised OpP, which
113
has that type). Op2 is a function of type < ν, < ν, ν >> that raises the type of the
DP and intersects the function denoted by DP with another function G (here the
raised OpP).15
(174) [[ Op2 ]]= λFν.λGν.λxe.λws.F(x)(w) = G(x)(w) = 1
The two sister nodes can now combine straightforwardly via function applica-
tion, producing an Op2P with type et which can then continue to combine with
the semantically contentful determiner (which has the usual type <et,e>).
As in Alexiadou and Wilder (1998), the alternate word order the book the red
results if the lower DP (DP2) raises to the specifier of the higher one (DP1).
(175) DP1
llll
llll
ll
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LL
Spec,DP1P
llll
llll
ll
D01
the+de f
Op2Pν
llll
llll
ll
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LL
Spec,Op2P
llll
llll
ll
Op20<ν,<ν,ν>> XP
lll
lll
lll
lll
lll
lll
lll
lll
lll
l
RRRR
RRRR
RR
Op1Pν
XX
llll
llll
ll
RRRR
RRRR
RR
DP2ν
QQ
?
<
:
8
6
4
2
0
.
,
+
)
(
&
%
$
"
llll
llll
ll
RRRR
RRRR
RR
Op10<<ν,ν>,ν> AP<ν,ν>
qqq
qqq
q
MMM
MMM
M
D02
‘the’∅de f
NPν
uu
uu
uu
II
II
II
red
book
15The effect of Op2 is not unlike that of Predicate Modification. However, there are two crucial
differences. First, it is a syntactic object that combines via function application and not a special
compositional rule. Second, in this case intersection seems to be precisely what we need for
appropriate interpretation of DS structures according to native speakers. See in particular data
from Lekakou and Szendro˝i (2007) on this point.
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If there is more than one adjective, the process iterates:
(176) DP1
llll
llll
ll
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LL
Spec,DP1
llll
llll
ll
D01
the+de f
Op2Pν
llll
llll
ll
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LL
Spec,Op2P
llll
llll
ll
Op20<ν,<ν,ν>> XP
lll
lll
lll
lll
lll
lll
lll
lll
lll
l
RRRR
RRRR
RR
Op1P
XX
llll
llll
ll
RRRR
RRRR
RR
DP2
QQ
?
<
:
8
6
4
2
0
.
,
+
)
(
&
%
$
"
llll
llll
ll
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LL
Op10 AP1
qqq
qqq
q
MMM
MMM
M
Spec,DP2P
llll
llll
ll
big
D02
‘the’∅de f
Op2Pν
llll
llll
ll
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LL
Spec,Op2P
llll
llll
ll
Op20<ν,<ν,ν>> XP
lll
lll
lll
lll
lll
lll
lll
lll
lll
l
RRRR
RRRR
RR
Op1P
XX
llll
llll
ll
RRRR
RRRR
RR
DP3
llll
llll
ll
RRRR
RRRR
RR
QQ
?
<
:
8
6
4
2
0
.
,
+
)
(
&
%
$
"
Op10 AP2
qqq
qqq
q
MMM
MMM
M
D03
‘the’∅de f
NP
uu
uu
uu
II
II
II
red
book
DP2 is semantically transparent (since its head is semantically null) and inherits
type ν from the Op2P it dominates. AP1 combines with its own Op1, and the
resulting Op1P (of type ν) raises to the specifier of Op2P. The entire DP2 com-
bines with Op2, and that complex combines with the Op1P that has raised to
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its sister node, forming an Op2P with type ν. Finally Op2P combines with the
semantically contentful determiner in D01. Again, raising of any given DP to the
specifier of any higher DP is optionally available, producing varied word order.
With only the minimal change of replacing Alexiadou and Wilder’s relative
clause structure with the one proposed here, we have already gained several
advantages over their proposal. There is no unmotivated clausal structure, AP
raising is fully motivated, and the fact that the movement of AP is type-driven
ensures that it will not conflict with DP raising.
4.6.1 Group II adjectives in DS
What happens when we attempt to use a Group II adjective in DS? Let’s return
to a simpler predicative structure: a sentence that uses a Group II adjective as a
postcopular predicate.
(177) a. John is an alleged murderer.
b. ?? John is alleged.
Lexical entries for alleged and murderer are repeated here.
(178) a. [[ alleged ]] = λFν.λxe.λws.∃a ∀w′ w0Raw′ → F(w′)(x)
b. [[ murderer ]] = λy.λw.y is a murderer in w
I have argued for a constraint restricting the combination of Op1 with Group
II adjectives, repeated here:
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(179) Constraint restricting the application of Op1:
A predicate Fν is anomalous if for any two members x and y of the set
De (the set of all individuals), F(x) = F(y).
A Group II adjective in DS will violate the constraint. Let us examine what
happens if, instead of red, we try to merge alleged in the DS structure.
(180) DP1
llll
llll
ll
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LL
Spec,DP1P
llll
llll
ll
D01
the+de f
Op2Pν
llll
llll
ll
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LLL
LL
Spec,Op2P
llll
llll
ll
Op20<ν,<ν,ν>> XP
lll
lll
lll
lll
lll
lll
lll
lll
lll
l
RRRR
RRRR
RR
Op1Pet
XX
llll
llll
ll
RRRR
RRRR
RR
DP2ν
llll
llll
ll
RRRR
RRRR
RR
Op10<<ν,ν>,ν> AP<ν,ν>
qqq
qqq
q
MMM
MMM
M
D02
‘the’∅de f
NPν
uu
uu
uu
II
II
II
alleged
murderer
No adjective is able to remain in its merged position in DS, since once it com-
bines with Op1 in its base position the Op1 phrase becomes uninterpretable in
situ. However, there is a difference between an Op1P formed by Op1 plus a
Group I adjective and one formed by combining Op1 with a Group II adjec-
tive. The Op1P with the Group I adjective is uninterpretable in situ because of
a type mismatch, but given a sister node with the right type its contribution to
the meaning of the DP will be straightforward. An Op1P with a Group II adjec-
tive, on the other hand, will have the same trivial interpretation as any predicate
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formed by Op1 plus a Group II adjective. In (180) we have an Op1P with the
following semantics:
(181) [[ Op1P ]] = λx.λw.∃a ∀w′ wRaw′ → 1
The combination of Op1P and a Group II adjective is already ruled out by the
constraint on trivial predication. But let us continue with the derivation and see
whether incorporating the anomalous Op1P into a larger structure will allow us
to recover.
DP2 has the semantics of the NP it dominates:
(182) [[ DP2 ]]= λy.λw.y is a murderer in w
When Op2 combines with DP2, we get:
(183) [[ Op2 ]] ([[ DP2 ]]) = λFν.λGν.λxe.λw.λy.λv.y is a murderer in v(x)(w) ∧
G(x)(w)
=λGν.λxe.λws. x is a murderer in w ∧ G(x)
This then combines with Op1P, which sits in its sister node:
(184) [[ Op2P ]] = [λGν.λxe.λws. x is a murderer in w∧G(x)] (λxe.λw.∃a ∀w′ wRaw′ →
1)
= λxe.λws. x is a murderer in w ∧ ∃a ∀w′ wRaw′ → 1
(180) has been judged anomalous by native speakers.16 Apparently, incor-
porating the anomalous Op1P into the larger DS structure cannot mitigate the
16See Alexiadou and Wilder (1998), page 306.
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anomaly. In this, DS also conforms to a second constraint posited earlier in the
dissertation: the economy constraint that rules out structures containing a triv-
ial predicate. In the DS case, raising to Spec,Op2P is obligatory to prevent type
mismatch, just as it would be with a Group I adjecitve, but it cannot alleviate the
ungrammaticality of a trivial predicate resulting from the combination of Op1
with a Group II adjective.
4.7 Discussion
By replacing Alexiadou and Wilder’s relative clause structure for DS, we have
avoided a number of the problems noted above. First, we no longer have full
clausal structure, an immediate advantage since none seems to be needed to
accommodate the DS data. Second, we have two different types of movement,
one type-driven and the other feature-driven. The AP, which in Alexiadou and
Wilder’s analysis was forced to raise without any principled explanation, must
raise in order to be interpreted, since in situ it combines with an operator and
the Op1 + AP complex produces a type mismatch. DPs, on the other hand, can
still raise for word-order variations but do so for entirely separate reasons.17 No
potential conflict between AP and DP raising to various A′ positions ever arises.
Third, on the current proposal, which includes Op1 as part of the basic phrase
structure of the DS DP, PPs are automatically banned from DS, which conforms
with the data, since Op1 combines only with APs.
Additionally, we now have a principled explanation for the anomaly of
17DP may raise to the specifier of a higher DP to check a syntactic feature, as Alexiadou and
Wilder as well as Androutsopoulou suggest, or the information structure of DS may play a role
in motivation the movement. Either way, it is certainly not type-driven.
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Group II adjectives in their raised position within DS. Without Op1, all adjec-
tives would be bad in the base position—as in any predicate position, they have
the wrong type. But the behavior of a given adjective when it combines with
Op1, which is part of the DS structure simply by virtue of the fact that adjec-
tives are used as predicates in that construction, is now the determining factor
in whether an adjective will be fully licit in DS or not.
4.7.1 Crosslinguistic distribution of Op2?
We have seen the Op1 is an operator that occurs anytime an adjective is used as
a predicate. It would be interesting to know whether Op2 is specific to DS or
whether it also occurs elsewhere in the syntax of Greek or some other language.
Understanding how freely it is distributed might be a key to understanding
why Greek has DS in the first place. From Alexiadou and Wilder’s analysis, it is
not entirely clear why DS occurs in Greek but not in other languages that have
relative clauses. I leave this inquiry for future work.
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